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Abstract 
Network intrusion detection is a real-world problem that involves detecting intrusions on a computer 
network. Detecting whether a network connection is intrusive or non-intrusive is essentially a binary 
classification problem. However, the type of intrusive connections can be categorised into a number 
of network attack classes and the task of associating an intrusion to a particular network type is 
multiclass classification.  
A number of artificial intelligence techniques have been used for network intrusion detection 
including Evolutionary Algorithms. This thesis investigates the application of evolutionary algorithms 
namely, Genetic Programming (GP), Grammatical Evolution (GE) and Multi-Expression Programming 
(MEP) in the network intrusion detection domain. Grammatical evolution and multi-expression 
programming are considered to be variants of GP. In this thesis, a comparison of the effectiveness of 
classifiers evolved by the three EAs within the network intrusion detection domain is performed. The 
comparison is performed on the publicly available KDD99 dataset. Furthermore, the effectiveness of 
a number of fitness functions is evaluated.    
From the results obtained, standard genetic programming performs better than grammatical 
evolution and multi-expression programming. The findings indicate that binary classifiers evolved 
using standard genetic programming outperformed classifiers evolved using grammatical evolution 
and multi-expression programming. For evolving multiclass classifiers different fitness functions used 
produced classifiers with different characteristics resulting in some classifiers achieving higher 
detection rates for specific network intrusion attacks as compared to other intrusion attacks. The 
findings indicate that classifiers evolved using multi-expression programming and genetic 
programming achieved high detection rates as compared to classifiers evolved using grammatical 
evolution. 
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1 Introduction 
 Purpose of the Study 
 
 Network intrusion detection is a real-world problem that involves detecting intrusions on a computer 
network. Detecting whether a network connection is intrusive or non-intrusive is essentially a binary 
classification problem. However, the type of intrusive connections can be categorized into a number 
of network attack classes and the task of associating an intrusion to a particular network type is 
multiclass classification.   
Various techniques have been used for network intrusion detection including Naive Bayes 
classification, decision tree classification, neural networks and evolutionary algorithms, amongst 
others. Evolutionary algorithms such as genetic programming and its variants have been widely 
applied for network intrusion detection but a comparison of the performance of each variant within 
network intrusion detection has not been addressed. This dissertation also seeks to conduct a 
thorough analysis of related literature on the application of genetic programming and its variants for 
network intrusion detection. 
 Aims and Objectives 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to develop, and evaluate the classification performance of 
genetic programming and variants of genetic programming, grammatical evolution and multi-
expression programming for network intrusion detection. The objectives of this dissertation are:  
Objective 1: Development and evaluation of applying grammatical evolution (GE) for generating 
intrusion detection classifiers 
To propose and implement binary and multi-class classifiers for network intrusion detection (NID) and 
evaluate the performance of applying GE for evolving NID classifiers. 
Chapter  1 
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Objective 2: Development and evaluation of applying Multi-expression programming (MEP) for 
generating binary and multi-class classifiers for network intrusion detection.  
To propose, implement and evaluate the performance of evolving classifiers using MEP for intrusion 
detection.  
Objective 3: Development and evaluation of applying genetic programming (GP) for generating 
binary and multiclass classifiers for network intrusion detection.  
Investigate the performance of binary and multi-class classifiers evolved using GP and compare the 
performance of the classifiers to state-of-the-art approaches. 
Objective 4: Investigate the effectiveness of fitness functions for multi-class network intrusion 
detection  
To investigate the effects of applying different fitness functions for the generation of intrusion 
detection classifiers and if there a correlation between the detection rate achieved by the classifier 
and the fitness function used. 
Objective 5: Comparative analysis of GE, MEP and GP for network intrusion detection. 
A comparative analysis of binary and multi-class classifiers evolved using grammatical evolution, multi-
expression programming and genetic programming will be performed to evaluate which of the 
approaches generates the most effective classifiers. 
 Contributions 
This dissertation makes the following contributions: 
• Design and evaluation of generating effective classifiers using genetic programming, 
grammatical evolution and multi-expression programming. 
• Comparative analysis of the effects of fitness functions when evolving binary and multi-class 
intrusion detection classifiers. 
• Comparative analysis of the performance of intrusion detection classifiers generated using 
different variants of genetic programming. 
 
 Dissertation Layout 
This section provides a summary of the chapters in this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 – Genetic Programming 
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This chapter provides an introduction to genetic programming and its variants, grammatical evolution 
and multi-expression programming. A thorough description of each process within the variants is 
provided.    
Chapter 3 – Network intrusion detection 
Network intrusion detection (NID) is introduced in this chapter. The datasets and performance 
measures used within NID are also described as well as current and previous research work done 
within the network intrusion detection domain. 
Chapter 4 – Genetic Programming and Network Intrusion Detection 
This chapter reviews studies conducted within the network intrusion detection domain as well as an 
analysis of using genetic programming and its variants for network intrusion detection. 
Chapter 5 – Methodology 
The methodology used to achieve the aims and objectives outlined in Section 1.2 is discussed in this 
chapter. The statistical tests used to evaluate the performance of algorithms is provided in this chapter 
as well as a detailed description of the datasets used for this thesis. 
Chapter 6 – Genetic Programming for Network Intrusion Detection 
This chapter details the proposed genetic programming approach for binary and multi-class network 
intrusion detection. 
Chapter 7 – Grammatical Evolution for Network Intrusion Detection 
The grammatical evolution approach for binary and multi-class network intrusion detection is 
presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 8 – Multi-Expression Programming for Network Intrusion Detection 
The multi-expression programming approach used for binary and multi-class classification is 
presented in this chapter.  
Chapter 9 – Results and Discussion 
This chapter presents the results of each of the proposed approaches discussed from chapter six to 
eight. A comparison of the performance between each of the genetic programming variants is 
performed.  
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Chapter 10 – Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter summarizes the findings presented in this thesis and a conclusion to each of the 
objectives outlined in Chapter 1. The chapter also discusses future work which will be investigated.   
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2 Genetic Programming 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter introduces genetic programming and its variants as well as provides details of the 
different aspects of the algorithm. 
Sections 2.2 introduces genetic programming, followed by an overview of genetic programming in 
section 2.3. Representation in genetic programming is discussed in section 2.4, initial population 
generation methods are discussed in section 2.5. Each individual within a genetic programming 
population is evaluated for performance and these evaluation methods are discussed in section 2.6. 
Selection methods are provided in section 2.7 and genetic operators are discussed in section 2.8. 
Control models are discussed in section 2.9 and termination criteria used in GP are described in section 
2.10. Introns and bloat are discussed in section 2.11, details of modularisation are provided in section 
2.12  and the strengths and weaknesses of genetic programming are provided in section 2.13. 
Section 2.14 introduces grammatical evolution, one of the variants of genetic programming. 
Section 2.15 provides an overview of grammatical evolution, followed by the representation in section 
2.16. Initial population generation in grammatical evolution is discussed in section 2.17 and the 
genetic operators used in grammatical evolution are described in section 2.18. Introns and bloat in 
the context of grammatical evolution is discussed in section 2.19 followed by an overview of the 
strengths and weakness of grammatical evolution in section 2.20. 
Multi-expression programming is introduced in section 2.21. Multi-expression programming is one 
of the variants of genetic programming. The overview of multi-expression programming is provided in 
section 2.22, followed by the representation in section 2.23. Section 2.24 discusses the initial 
population generation for multi-expression programming and genetic operators are discussed in 
section 2.25. Introns and modularisation within multi-expression programming is discussed in section 
Chapter  2 
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2.26 followed by the strengths and weaknesses of multi-expression programming in section 2.27. 
Section 2.28 presents a summary of the critical aspects of genetic programming and its variants.  
 Introduction to Genetic Programming 
Evolutionary algorithms (EA) are a class of optimization algorithms from artificial intelligence which 
take an analogy from evolution to solve computer science problems. The user defines a goal in the 
form of a quality criterion and the EA uses the defined goal to measure and compare solutions through 
a number of iterations until an optimal or near optimal solution is found [3]. Solutions are found in 
the search space. The search space is a search area which contains potential solutions to a problem. 
Most evolutionary algorithms adopt processes such as reproduction, selection and mutation from 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection and evolution in order to efficiently find solutions within the 
search space [81]. The theory of natural selection states that individuals with certain characteristics 
(stored in the genes) are more likely to survive and replicate their characteristics to the offspring and 
gradually improve the characteristics of the population created [25]. Different EAs differ in the way in 
which solutions are represented and the way in which new solutions are derived from existing 
solutions. A genetic algorithm (GA) is an evolutionary population-based algorithm that was inspired 
by John Holland in the early 1970s to model Darwin’s theory of natural selection. A GA evolves a 
population of individuals towards better solutions. Each individual within the population is encoded 
as a string which represents a potential solution to a given problem. The GA searches for solutions to 
problems within the solution space [53, 81]. 
Genetic programming (GP) pioneered by Koza [40], is a problem solving EA in which programs are 
evolved to find solutions to problems. GP conducts search for a solution program to a problem in the 
program space. GP mimics the theory of natural selection and it is closely related to GAs. GP searches 
a program space and a GA searches a solution space resulting in the structure of the representations 
being different. GP is stochastic in nature; it is not guaranteed to find the global optimum, but a good 
enough solution defined by the researcher.  
 Overview of the GP Algorithm 
A suitable representation is initially required before the GP algorithm is executed. The GP algorithm 
begins by generating a population of individuals made up from a combination of functions and 
terminals suitable for the domain. The population of individuals initially created is termed the initial 
population. Each individual in the initial population is assigned a value to determine how fit the 
individual is. The assigned value is termed as the fitness. Based on the fitness of the individual, the 
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algorithm can terminate execution. If a solution is found in the initial population, the algorithm 
terminates and returns the solution individual.  
If a solution is not found in the initial population, the individuals go through transformations using 
genetic operators to create better individuals. Each transformation creates a generation. A generation 
is a population of individuals which are created using genetic operators. A selection method is used to 
select individuals from the population. Genetic operators are applied to the individuals selected. 
Individuals created from the application of genetic operators are referred to as offspring. After each 
generation, each offspring created is evaluated for quality. The generation of offspring iteratively 
continues until a solution is found or termination criterion is reached. The iterative process can either 
replace the whole population of individuals or specific individuals with a low fitness. The process from 
initial population generation, genetic operator applications, generations until a termination criterion 
is met is defined as a run. Each of the fundamental aspects of a GP run are discussed further in the 
following sections. 
 Representation 
Elements of the GP population are programs, commonly represented as parse trees [74]. Other 
program representations include linear and graph representations [3]. A number of factors are 
considered when selecting the representation to use, these factors include efficiency, ease of 
implementation and information to be represented by the individuals [74]. A parse tree is comprised 
of elements of the function and terminal sets. The elements of the function and terminal sets are 
collectively called primitives. Genetic programming using a parse tree representation is also known as 
tree-based GP. Tree-based GP, functions and terminals are discussed below. 
2.4.1 Tree Based GP 
Each individual is represented as a parse tree for tree-based GP. Koza [40] represented programs in 
LISP (S-expression) which is equivalent to a parse tree representing a computer program. Pre-order 
notation is usually used to express parse trees for easy interpretation. Each parse tree is made up of 
one or several nodes. The first node within the parse tree is referred to as the root and the nodes that 
are found at the bottom of the parse tree are the leaves. 
2.4.2 Function Set 
The function set contains domain dependent functions. Mathematical functions, conditional 
statements, logical operators are examples of some of the functions. User defined functions can also 
be included in the function set. Each function has an arity. Arity is the number of arguments which a 
function takes [3]. 
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2.4.3 Terminal Set 
The terminal set is comprised of variables that make up the trees used to solve the GP problem. The 
variables can be of type string, real, integer or character. Constants such as ephemeral constants can 
be included in the trees used to solve the problem. Random ephemeral constants are values that fall 
within a specific range and remain unchanged during the entire duration of the run. For example, a 
random ephemeral constant with a range of integer values [1, 10] can be used, during a GP run if the 
ephemeral constant is selected, a random integer will be selected from the range [1, 10] and remain 
fixed for the duration of the GP run. Multiple ephemeral constants with different values can be used 
and the range is problem dependent. Elements of the terminal set have an arity of zero [3]. 
 Initial Population Generation 
The initial population is made up of randomly created individuals. Three methods exist for the 
generation of the initial population namely full, grow, and ramped half and half [40]. The generation 
of each individual begins by randomly selecting a function from the function set to represent the root 
node of the individual. The root node of the tree is selected from the function set in order to eliminate 
the creation of trivial trees (trees with a terminal element as the root node). Based on the arity of the 
root node selected, children are randomly chosen from the function and terminal sets and these are 
expanded iteratively in a depth first manner until a complete tree is created. The maximum depth of 
a tree is the distance from the root node to the bottom-most leaf node.  In Figure 2.1, the root node 
of the individual is located at depth 1, whilst the child nodes of the root are located at depth 2 and 
the maximum depth of the tree is depth 4. The maximum depth of a tree is specified when creating 
the initial population in order to limit the size of the tree during initial population generation.  
depth 1
depth 2
depth 3
depth 4
Maximum depth =  4  
Figure 2.1: Tree depth 
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If the search space is not sufficiently represented during initial population generation, it may lead 
to premature convergence to a local optimum of the GP algorithm. The search space has to be 
sufficiently represented in order to increase the chances of finding a global optimum. The number of 
individuals created is controlled by the population size which is specified as one of the parameters of 
a GP algorithm. 
2.5.1 Full Method 
The full method creates individuals which have a balanced tree. Balanced trees have all the leaf nodes 
at the same depth. The internal nodes for the trees are randomly selected from the function set only 
until the maximum tree depth is reached. At the maximum tree depth, only nodes from the terminal 
set are selected. Figure 2.2a illustrates a tree created using the full method. Trees created using full 
might not have the same number of nodes due to different functions possessing different arity values. 
The method promotes less variety within the population due to the similarity in the structure of the 
individuals created. 
AND
Notx
b
XOR
AND NOT
xba
a) b)
 
Figure 2.2: Tree individuals created using a) Full method and b) Grow method 
2.5.2 Grow Method 
The grow method creates individuals with irregular shapes and sizes [40]. The root of the individual is 
randomly selected from the function set. The rest of the nodes are randomly selected from either the 
function or terminal set until the tree depth limit is reached. Once the tree depth limit is reached only 
elements from the terminal set are selected. Figure 2.2b illustrates an individual created by the grow 
method. The grow method promotes greater variety within the population due to individuals 
possessing different shapes and sizes. 
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2.5.3 Ramped Half and Half Method 
The ramped half and half method combine the full and grow methods discussed above. Half the 
population is created using the full method and the other half of the population is created using the 
grow method. An equal number of trees of each depth are also created. Koza [40] introduced this 
method of generation to provide a wide variety of trees created with different sizes and shapes.  
For example, given a population size of 16 with a maximum tree depth of 5, at each tree depth half 
the population is created using the full method and the other half using the grow method. This means 
that at depth of 2, two individuals are created using the grow method and another two using the full 
method, at depth 3, two individuals using grow and two individuals using full, this continues until the 
maximum tree depth of 5 is reached. Figure 2.3 illustrates individuals created using the ramped half-
and-half method. 
 
Full Grow
Depth 2
 
Full Grow
Depth 3
 
Full Grow
Depth 4
 
Full Grow
Depth 5
 
Figure 2.3: Ramped half-and-half 
 Evaluation  
Each individual within a population is evaluated in terms of how well it solves a problem. Fitness 
provides a measure to the GP algorithm regarding which individuals should be given a higher 
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probability of being removed from the population as well as which individuals should be allowed to 
reproduce and recombine with other individuals within the population [3]. Evaluating the fitness of 
an individual is problem dependent and literature provides a vast amount of methods to use. Fitness 
cases and fitness functions are used to calculate fitness.  
2.6.1 Fitness Cases 
Programs within the population are executed over a set of different training cases. These training 
cases are referred to as fitness cases. Fitness cases are input-output pairs which describe the output 
to be produced by individuals given particular input values [3]. The success of a GP algorithm is to an 
extent dependent on the choice of fitness cases. Fitness cases should provide a good ratio of 
representing the problem domain to ensure generalization over the solutions produced by a GP run. 
The fitness of an individual is a function of the output produced by the individual and the target value 
for each fitness case. Table 2.1 provides an illustration of fitness cases. 
Input 
Values 
 
Output 
X Y 
4 10 116 
5 7 74 
6 3 45 
7 9 130 
Table 2.1: Fitness Cases 
2.6.2 Fitness Functions 
A numerical measure of how well an individual represents a solution is calculated using a fitness 
function. They can be used to evaluate how well an individual expresses the fitness cases [3]. The 
fitness function is a fitness measure that is used to compare different individuals within the population 
with respect to how far or close an individual is from the desired output. Different fitness functions 
are used for different problem domains. Fitness functions play an important role in driving the GP 
algorithm towards the global optimum and they should be designed carefully in order to prevent them 
from driving the algorithm towards local optima [42]. Raw fitness is one of the simplest and most 
commonly used fitness measures. It measures how promising an individual is at solving the problem. 
The error function is another commonly used fitness function. In some domains a high raw fitness 
represents a better individual whereas in some domains, it represents a weak individual [40]. Another 
fitness measure commonly used is the number of hits. The number of hits is the number of fitness 
cases for which the value produced by an individual is the same for each fitness case. It is used to 
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determine whether a solution has been found. For example, if a GP individual represents an expression 
𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑦𝑦2 based on the fitness cases provided in Table 2.1, the number of hits would be 4 signifying a 
solution to the problem since there are four fitness cases. The greater the number of hits, the better 
the individual. In certain problem domains, the raw fitness is equivalent to the hits ratio.  
Fitness functions have either a single objective or multiple objectives where two or more different 
measures are combined to solve a problem. These fitness functions are referred to as multi-objective 
fitness functions [3]. 
 Selection Methods 
Selection methods are methods used to select individuals responsible for offspring generation. The 
selected individuals are referred to as parents. Selection methods use fitness measures to select 
parents. Commonly employed selection methods are tournament selection and fitness-proportionate 
selection [40, 74]. Other selection methods used include truncation, ranking, linear and exponential 
selection [3]. 
Selection methods offer different effects on evolution and offspring generation. One of the effects 
is referred to as selection pressure.  Selection pressure is the degree to which fitter individuals are 
favoured. Algorithms with high selection pressure favour fitter individuals as compared to algorithms 
with lower selection pressure. Selection pressure also controls the convergence rate of a GP approach; 
very high selection pressure may lead to premature convergence whilst a low selection pressure leads 
to a slower rate of convergence [52]. 
2.7.1 Tournament Selection 
A random number of individuals are selected from the population to perform in a tournament. 
Comparison of each of the individuals within the tournament using the fitness value is performed. 
Based on the fitness the best individual is returned. The number of individuals randomly selected is 
referred to as the tournament size. A small tournament size promotes lower selection pressure and a 
high tournament size promotes higher selection pressure [3]. Tournament selection is commonly used 
within GP. 
Tournament selection can also be applied inversely. Inverse tournament selection is applied in the 
same manner with tournament selection but instead of returning the best individual from the 
tournament, the worst individual is returned. Inverse tournament selection is used within the steady 
state GP control method discussed later in this chapter. 
 
13 
 
 Genetic Operators 
Genetic operators are search operators used to create individuals within a population. Genetic 
operators alter existing individuals in the hope of generating better offspring which solve the problem 
[40]. The offspring created are of different sizes and shapes as compared to their parents. Genetic 
operators are used to explore different areas of the program space through exploitation and 
exploration. Exploration is used to visit entirely new regions of the program space and genetic 
operators which favour exploration are termed as global search operators. Exploitation on the other 
hand is used to visit regions of the program space within the neighbourhood of previously visited 
areas. Local search operators is the term associated with genetic operators which make use of 
exploitation [14]. A good ratio between exploitation and exploration needs to be maintained to ensure 
the search converges to a global optimum. During the evolution process, exploration is recommended 
at the early stages rather than exploitation to ensure the best area of the program space is explored 
and as the evolution progresses exploitation is more favoured to ensure that the algorithm converges. 
Various genetic operators have been used during the evolutionary process of GP. The three most 
commonly used genetic operators, reproduction, mutation and crossover, are discussed in detail 
below. Other genetic operators include permutation, decimation, encapsulation, hoist, create [40].  
The choice of genetic operators to use is usually probabilistic and the probability of application is 
referred to as operator application rates [74]. The operator rates are used to determine the number 
of offspring created by each of the genetic operators. The rates can be represented as percentage 
values, for example, a population of 200 individuals and a 50%, 30% and 20% application rate for 
crossover, mutation and reproduction respectively results in 100 individuals being created using 
crossover, 60 offspring created using mutation and 40 individuals created using the reproduction 
operator. Operator application rates are specified at the beginning of a GP run. 
Genetic operators can create very large offspring and pruning can be used to ensure that the 
individuals do not grow beyond a certain size. This is achieved by replacing all the function nodes at a 
specified tree depth (offspring depth) with randomly selected terminal nodes.  
Some genetic operators have been criticized for being destructive. One of the destructive effects 
is breaking good building blocks that could be used to form part of a solution [57]. 
2.8.1 Reproduction 
During reproduction, an individual is selected using one of the selection methods and copied to  the 
next generation without any alterations [3, 40, 74].  
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2.8.2 Mutation 
Mutation is a global search operator which creates an offspring by changing components of a single 
parent selected using one of the selection methods. Different variations of mutation exist such as 
shrink mutation, point mutation and subtree mutation. Subtree mutation is the most widely used form 
of mutation. Subtree mutation randomly selects a point within the selected individual (referred to as 
the mutation point) and replaces the subtree rooted at the mutation point with a newly randomly 
created subtree [40]. The grow method of population generation is generally used to create the 
subtree and mutation depth controls the depth of the subtree. Figure 2.4 illustrates the subtree 
mutation operator. Mutation promotes diversity within the population. 
XOR
AND
xy
OR
bx
AND
NOTx
x
XOR
AND
y
OR
bxAND
NOTx
x
Parent
Subtree
Offspring
Mutation 
point
 
Figure 2.4: Mutation operation 
2.8.3 Crossover 
The crossover operator is a local search operator which generates two offspring by exchanging 
different components (genetic material) between two parents. Two parents are selected using a 
selection method. A crossover point is randomly selected in each of the two parents. The subtrees at 
the selected points are exchanged between the two parents to create two offspring [3]. Figure 2.5 
Illustrates subtree crossover. Crossover promotes convergence within the population. 
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Figure 2.5: Crossover operation 
Crossover has been criticised for being a destructive genetic operator. It has the ability to insert a 
good building block into an individual that does not make proper use for it. Some authors have argued 
that the closer a tree is to a solution the more susceptible it is to the destructive effect of crossover 
[57].  
 GP Control Models 
There are two major models used to control the implementation of GP, the generational model and 
the steady-state model [3]. In generational GP, individuals in the population are replaced by new 
individuals after each iteration (termed as a generation). In steady-state GP, the weaker individuals 
are replaced as the evolutionary process continues. The two models are discussed further below. 
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2.9.1 Generational Model 
The generational control model illustrated by Algorithm 2.1 creates a new population from the 
previous population [3]. The algorithm randomly initializes the population using one of the initial 
population generation methods discussed in above. The fitness of the individuals in the generation 
are evaluated. A selection method is used to select parents which the genetic operators are applied 
to. The offspring created from the results of genetic operators are inserted in the next population. 
Iterations of the fitness evaluation and offspring creation are performed until a termination criterion 
is met.  
2.9.2 Steady State Model 
Algorithm 2.1 provides the steady-state control GP algorithm. Individuals are selected from the 
population using selection methods. Genetic operators are performed on the offspring returned from 
the selection methods [3]. Inverse selection methods are used to select the individual replaced by the 
offspring. 
Generational GP Algorithm 
Begin 
• Randomly initialize the population 
• Repeat 
o Evaluate the individual programs in the existing population. 
o Select an individual or individuals in the population using selection methods. 
o Perform genetic operators on the selected individual or individuals. 
o Insert the results of genetic operators into the new population. 
• Until a termination criterion is met. 
End 
Return the best individual from the population or solution to the problem. 
Algorithm 2.1: Generational GP 
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 Termination 
Termination criteria are measures used to stop the execution of the GP run. Different termination 
criteria are used within GP. Termination is problem dependent [74]. One of the most commonly used 
termination criteria is when a solution is found. In the event that a solution is not found, the best 
individual throughout all the generations is returned. The maximum number of generations can also 
be used as a termination criterion [40]. 
 Introns and Bloat 
Introns are blocks of redundant code that have no effect on the fitness of an individual. (NOT(NOT(X)) 
is an example of an intron, this block of code does nothing within an individual.  Bloat is the 
exponential program growth without any significant increase in terms of fitness [74]. Rapid increase 
of introns leads to bloat [3]. Bloat increases exponentially towards the end of a GP run and causes the 
GP algorithm to be stagnate. Introns can reduce the destructive effects of genetic operators [3]. 
Different methods such as the use of parsimony pressure have been implemented to reduce bloat. 
Modularisation has also been used to reduce introns and bloat [49]. 
Steady-State GP Algorithm 
Begin 
• Randomly initialize the population 
• Repeat 
o Randomly choose a subset of existing population to take part in tournament. 
o Evaluate subset individuals in the tournament. 
o Obtain the winner or winners from subset tournament. 
o Perform genetic operations on the winner or winners. 
o Apply inverse selection method and replace individual with results of genetic 
operations. 
• Until a termination criterion is met. 
End 
Return the best individual from the population or solution to the problem. 
Algorithm 2.2: Steady State GP 
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 Modularisation 
Modularisation is commonly used for problem-solving by which functional units of a program are 
identified and packaged for reuse. The methods encapsulate blocks of code. The encapsulated blocks 
of code become functions added to the function set and used in the creation of offspring. 
Modularisation attempts to tackle some of the main problems associated with GP; scaling and 
inefficiency [3]. Operators such as encapsulation and compression are some of methods which cater 
for modularisation of programs in GP [2, 40]. Automatically defined functions (ADFs) [8, 39] also caters 
for modularisation and enables GP to solve problems better [73]. 
 Strengths and Weaknesses of GP 
2.13.1 Strengths 
• Seeding is used for each GP run and this results in different solutions obtained for each run. 
• Easy interpretation and execution of solutions since each solution resembles a computer 
program. 
2.13.2 Weaknesses 
• Premature convergence due to lack of genetic diversity and the destructive effect of genetic 
operators. 
• A number of parameters are required to execute a GP run. Optimization of these parameters 
is essential in order to get the best solution for each problem domain. 
• No guarantee that GP will find a global optimum solution due to the stochastic nature of 
genetic programming. 
• Large run times can be experienced during GP execution. 
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 Introduction to Grammatical Evolution 
Grammatical Evolution (GE) is a grammar-based variation of Genetic Programming pioneered by Ryan 
et al. [59, 76]. GE performs the evolutionary process on variable-length binary strings unlike GP which 
performs its evolutionary process on actual programs. A bit within the binary string is referred to as 
an allele and a combination of 8 alleles form a codon. Each binary string codon represents an integer 
value which is used in a mapping process. GE is inspired by the biological process of generating a 
protein from the genetic material of an organism follows a similar mapping process. GE unlike GP, is a 
population of linear genotypic binary strings, which are transformed into functional programs through 
a genotypic-to-phenotypic mapping process [19, 60]. One of the weakness of GP is the inclusion of 
redundant code within individuals and GE minimizes redundant code [63]. 
 Overview of the Generational GE Algorithm 
The genotypic-to-phenotypic mapping process is governed by the use of a Backus-Naur Form (BNF) 
grammar, which describes the syntax of the language for the problem. Algorithm 2.3 provides an 
overview of the generational GE algorithm. The mapping process takes input (BNF grammar) and 
produces an output (programs). The created individuals within the population are evaluated for 
fitness. If a solution is not found within the initial population, the algorithm iteratively selects parents 
from the population using one of the selection methods. Genetic operators are applied to the 
Generational GE Algorithm 
Begin 
• Randomly initialize the population 
• Repeat 
o Evaluate the individual programs in the existing population. 
o Select an individual(s) in the population using selection methods. 
o Perform genetic operations on the selected individuals genotypic string(s). 
o Perform mapping process and generate phenotype. 
o Insert the offspring into the new population. 
• Until a termination criterion is met. 
End 
Return the best individual from the population or solution to the problem. 
Algorithm 2.3: Generational GE Algorithm 
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genotypic strings. The mapping process is repeated using the new genotypic strings created after 
genetic operators. The offspring created are evaluated for fitness. If a solution is not found, the 
evolutionary process iteratively continues until a termination condition is met.  
 Representation 
Each element of the population is a made up of a randomly generated binary string or denary string. 
This genotype is then converted to a program by the mapping process. The BNF grammar is used to 
define the syntax of valid programs [34]. BNF grammar and the mapping process are discussed in detail 
in the following sections. 
2.16.1 BNF Grammar 
BNF is a metalanguage (i.e. a language used to describe a language) which consists of the symbol ‘: : =’, 
denoting “is composed of”; and ‘|’ meaning a choice. It provides a notation for expressing the 
grammar of a language in the form of production rules. The BNF grammar is made up of the tuple N, 
T, P, S; where N is the set of all non-terminal symbols, T is the set of terminals, P is the set of 
productions rules that map N to T, and S is a member of N and the start symbol [60].  An example 
production rule is of the form: 
 < expression > : : = < variable > <operator> ge 
   | ge 
Where the non-terminals take the form < expression > (enclosed in angle brackets), and ge is an 
example of a terminal symbol.  
The above production rule states that an < expression > is composed of the non-terminal grammar 
for <variable> and <operator> as well as the terminal symbol ge. Alternatively, <expression> is 
composed solely of the terminal symbol ge. Production rules which can generate terminal symbols are 
referred to as terminal-producing production rules [13].  
Terminals in the context of GE are elements that appear in the program produced by GE. These 
terminals include operators such as *, +, -, / and the values they operate on such as constants, 
variables. Terminals are not limited to just operators and values; control statements and other 
structures can be referred to as terminals.  
The evolutionary process evolves binary strings and uses the binary strings evolved, the grammar 
and the mapping process in order to generate complete phenotypic programs [19, 60]. Domain 
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knowledge of a problem can be included within the grammar resulting in the generation of good 
solutions. 
2.16.2 Mapping Process 
The mapping process provides a distinction between the search space and the solution space [60]. A 
suitable BNF must be defined. This grammar specifies the syntax of the phenotypic programs to be 
produced by the GE. The genotype is used to map the start symbol to the terminals by converting the 
8-bit codons into integer values. Taking the leftmost integer codon value, the following mapping 
function is applied when selecting the appropriate production rule to use: 
 Rule = Codon Integer Value MOD number of rules for the current non-terminal 
Where the MOD function returns the remainder after a division operation (e.g. 3 MOD 2 = 1).  
The result produced after applying the mapping function corresponds to the production rule used 
to replace the Start symbol. If the production rule selected contains non-terminals, the leftmost non-
terminal is expanded first. The next integer codon in the chromosome is selected and the mapping 
function is applied to the next non-terminal. An example of the mapping process is provided below. 
If a production rule selected contains non-terminals, the mapping function is iteratively applied to 
the leftmost nonterminal symbol until one of the following situations arises: 
1. When all the non-terminals are converted to elements from the terminal set. 
2. The end of the genome is reached and the wrapping operator is applied whereby the mapping 
is iteratively repeated until a threshold of the maximum number of iterative repeats has been 
reached during mapping process. 
During the mapping process when individuals run out of codons to traverse the genome, the 
individuals are wrapped around and the codons are reused from the leftmost codon integer value. 
When the maximum number of wrapping is reached and the individual is still incompletely mapped, 
the mapping process is stopped and the individual is assigned the lowest fitness value [63].  Another 
termination criterion of the mapping process is also provided in Genr8 [34] where only the production 
rules that generate terminals are used to replace the non-terminals in the expression when the 
threshold of the number of wraps is exceeded. 
2.16.2.1 Mapping process example 
Consider the grammar: 
 R = {N, T, S, P} 
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Where:  
 Nonterminal symbols (N) are {exp, op, var}, 
Terminal set (T) is {+, -, /, *, X, 1}, 
Start symbol (S) is <exp> and 
Production rules (P) are: 
 <exp> : : = <exp> <op> <exp> (0) 
  | <var>   (1) 
 <op> : : = +   (0) 
  | -   (1) 
  | /   (2) 
  | *   (3) 
 <var> : : = X   (0) 
  | 1   (1) 
 
Rule 
Number 
Choices 
<exp> 2 
<op> 4 
<var> 2 
Table 2.2: The number of choices for each production rule 
Binary String (this is an element of the population) 
00010100 00100001 00010010 00010011 00100011 00000111 00001111 00100000 … 
 
    Binary to Integer (Denary) conversion 
Denary Values 
20 33 18 19 35 7 15 32 … 
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Start = <exp>      20 % 2 = 0 
  <exp> <op> <exp>    33 % 2 = 1 
  <var> <op> <exp>    18 % 2 = 0 
     X <op> <exp>    19 % 4 = 3 
     X    * <exp>    35 % 2 = 1 
     X    * <var>     7 % 2 = 1 
     X    *     1    Mapping Complete 
From the example above the individual created (phenotypic program) from the genotypes and the 
mapping process is(𝑥𝑥 ∗ 1). Some of the integer genotypes where not used during the mapping 
process. 
 Initial Population Generation and Evaluation 
Initial population generation involves creating random chromosomes. The number of chromosomes 
created is determined by the population size specified in the parameters. Each chromosome is 
composed of random binary strings. The number of codons specified as a parameter determines the 
number of binary strings in each chromosome. Each binary string codon in the chromosome is 
converted to a denary value. 
Evaluation of the chromosome takes place by applying the mapping process using the denary 
values and the grammar provided to generate a program. The wrap-over threshold limit is also 
specified as one of the parameters before the program executes to ensure the mapping process 
terminates when a specified number of wraps is exceeded. Evaluation methods, selection methods 
and termination criterion used within GE are the same as processes described for genetic 
programming in sections 2.6, 2.7 and 2.10 respectively. 
 Genetic Operators 
Genetic operators are used to create the next generation during the evolution process. Dempsey [19] 
stated that genetic operators from Holland’s Genetic Algorithm (GA) can be applied to the  genotypic 
strings. Some of the operators employed from GAs are discussed below.  
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2.18.1 Crossover 
Crossover generates offspring by combining genotypic material from two parents selected using 
selection methods. A number of crossover operators have been applied in GE. These include one-point 
crossover, two-point crossover and homologous crossover. 
One-point crossover [60] randomly selects a crossover point in each of the parent binary string 
codons. Alleles located after the crossover point are swapped between the two individuals to generate 
two offspring. Figure 2.6 illustrates one-point crossover, where the crossover point is four. The 
highlighted strings represent alleles from parent 1 and the non-highlighted strings represent alleles 
from parent 2. 
Parent 1   10011010 01010111 …. 
     
Parent 2  10111100 00011101 … 
     
Offspring 1  10011100 01011101 … 
     
Offspring 2  10111010 00010111 .. 
Figure 2.6: GE fixed length one-point crossover 
For each codon in the parents, two-point crossover randomly selects two crossover points and 
swaps alleles located between the crossover points [60]. Figure 2.7 illustrates two-point crossover, 
where the crossover points are at position three and 7.  
Parent 1   10011010 01010111 …. 
     
Parent 2  10111100 00011101 … 
     
Offspring 1  10011100 01011101 … 
     
Offspring 2  10111010 00010111 .. 
Figure 2.7: GE two-point crossover 
Homologous crossover [60] is a modified two-point crossover where the mapping process history 
of production rules used is kept for each of the individuals. Homologous crossover is applied to the 
denary values and not the binary strings. The mapping process history of the selected individuals is 
read from the left until a region of similarity (when the same production rule is selected on both 
individuals) is found. The first crossover point is selected at the boundary of the region of similarity in 
 
25 
 
both the individuals. The second crossover point is randomly selected from the region of dissimilarity 
(when the production rules selected are different on both individuals). The codons located between 
the two crossovers points are then swapped between the individuals. Homologous crossover has two 
variations, one that swaps blocks of the same size and the other which swaps blocks of differing 
lengths.  
Figure 2.8 illustrates homologous crossover which swaps blocks of the same size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Homologous Crossover 
In Figure 2.8, the region of similarity is denoted by the area highlighted in the parent integer 
codons. The second crossover point is the same in both individuals and the region highlighted in the 
offspring signifies the codons which were swapped between the two parents.  
Homologous crossover requires more memory for execution compared to the other approaches 
and there is no clear procedure in the event that there is no region of similarity between the parents. 
2.18.2 Mutation 
A suitable parent is selected using the selection methods and mutation changes a bit or an integer 
value to another random value within the genotype of the parent generating an offspring. Changes 
                                                                   Crossover Point 1 
 
 Crossover Point 2 
 
Parent 1 
Integer codons 20 33 18 19 35 07 15 32 … 
Production Rules 0 1 0 3 1 1 0 0 … 
 
 
Parent 2 
Integer codons 34 25 15 18 20 06 45 66 … 
Production Rules 3 2 0 3 2 0 1 1 … 
 
    Crossover Point 2 
                                                                  Crossover Point 1 
 Integer codons 
Offspring 1 20 33 18 19 20 06 45 32 … 
Offspring 2 34 25 15 18 35 07 15 66 … 
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within the genotypic strings might however have no effect on the phenotype. For example, given the 
following BNF production rule: 
 <var> : : = X  (0) 
   | 1  (1) 
where <var> can either be replaced by variable X or 1. If mutation is performed and each time a binary 
string which evaluates to an even number is created, the production rule will always select the same 
variable X. This is termed to as neutral mutation [19]. 
Different mutation operators are adopted from GA. Some of the mutation operators are discussed 
below. The bit flip mutation operator inverts the alleles in the binary string meaning that if an allele is 
a 0, it is changed to 1 or if it is a 1, it is changed to 0. Interchanging mutation randomly selects two 
points within the binary codon and the alleles corresponding to the positions are interchanged. 
Flipping mutation randomly generates a binary string (mutation chromosome). The mutation 
chromosome is aligned with the parent binary codon and traversed from left to right. Whenever a 1 
is found in the mutation chromosome, the corresponding bit in the parent binary codon is flipped (0 
to1 and 1 to 0) generating the offspring [81]. Figure 2.9 illustrates the different mutation operators 
discussed above. The highlighted alleles represent where the changes took place. 
Bit Flip mutation Parent 10101010 
Offspring 01010101 
   
 
Interchanging mutation 
Parent 10111110 
Mutation points Points 4 and 8 
Offspring 10101111 
   
 
Flipping mutation 
Parent  00101110 
Mutation Chromosome 10001001 
Offspring 10000001 
   
Figure 2.9: Mutation Operator Variations 
 Introns and Bloat 
Introns are part of the genotypic strings which are not used during the mapping process. If all the non-
terminals are not expanded without using all the codons, all the remaining codons are introns. If 
introns within individuals grow exponentially, they result in bloat as previously discussed in section 
2.11. Different methods of controlling introns and bloat have been applied within GE. The use of 
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parsimony pressure and modularisation are among the methods used to control bloat within GE [33, 
58]. 
 Strengths and Weakness of GE 
GE benefits from some of the strengths and weakness addressed in section 2.13 but it also has other 
strengths and shortcomings different from GP which are discussed below. 
2.20.1 Strengths 
• The GE wrapping operator allows short chromosomes to translate into very long expressions 
and provides an efficient way of avoiding invalid expressions. 
• Domain knowledge can be included within the BNF grammar resulting in better tailor-made 
solutions to problems. 
• Bloat does not occur in the phenotype solutions, making solutions produced easy to 
understand. 
2.20.2 Weaknesses 
• Longer computational time is required to translate from the genotype to the phenotype 
during program execution. 
• Different genotype strings can map to the same phenotype string reducing the diversity of 
using different genotypic strings. 
  
 
28 
 
 Introduction to Multi-Expression Programming 
Multi-Expression Programming (MEP) was first introduced by Oltean [62] as a variant of Genetic 
Programming (GP). MEP enables the automatic generation of computer programs in a similar manner 
to standard GP. MEP use a linear solution representation and each MEP individual (chromosome) 
encodes multiple linear expressions (computer programs) referred to as genes. MEP individuals have 
the ability to encode several syntactically correct expressions in a chromosome, this ability is referred 
to as strong implicit parallelism. MEP has been applied to many different domains such as symbolic 
regression, classification, data analysis, evolving evolutionary algorithms, intrusion detection. 
 Overview of the Steady State MEP Algorithm 
Similar to standard GP, the first step is to randomly create an initial population of MEP individuals. 
Each individual in the population is evaluated based on the fitness function. The algorithm iteratively 
selects two parents randomly from the current population and applies the crossover operator to both 
parents obtaining two offspring. The mutation operator is then applied to both offspring and if the 
fitness of the best offspring is better than inverse selection method individual (poorer individual), the 
poorer individual is replaced with the best offspring. The iteration continues until a termination 
criterion is met [61]. Typically, the termination criterion is met when a solution is found or the 
Steady-State MEP Algorithm 
Begin 
• Randomly create an initial population 
• Repeat 
o Randomly select two parents from current population. 
o Apply crossover to the parents to generate two offspring. 
o Apply mutation to offspring. 
o If the fitness of the best offspring is better than inverse selection method individual, 
then 
Replace inverse selection individual with best offspring. 
End if 
• Until a termination criterion is met. 
End 
Return the best individual from the population. 
Algorithm 2.4: Steady-State MEP Algorithm 
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maximum number of iterations is reached [40]. If a solution is not found, then the best solution found 
during evolution is returned. Algorithm 2.4 illustrates a steady-state MEP algorithm. 
 
 Representation 
MEP chromosomes are made up of genes of variable length. The length of a chromosome is equivalent 
to the number of genes within the chromosome. A gene can either be a terminal gene or a function 
gene [61]. A gene within a chromosome is similar to an individual generated using standard GP. A 
terminal gene is created when only a terminal symbol is selected from the terminal set. A function 
gene is created by combining a function symbol from the function set and pointers representing other 
genes within the chromosome. The length of a chromosome is specified as one of the parameters for 
a MEP run. Evaluation of MEP individuals is similar to the evaluation for standard GP. 
 Initial Population Generation and Evaluation 
The first gene of a chromosome must be a terminal symbol in order to allow syntactically correct 
programs to be generated. For all the other genes, either a terminal gene or function gene can be 
encoded. Function genes include pointers to the function arguments. Function arguments always have 
positions of lower numerical value than the position of the function gene. Each of the genes in the 
chromosome are evaluated for fitness and the gene with the best fitness is used to represent the 
overall fitness of the chromosome. When more than one gene possess the best fitness, the first 
detected is chosen to represent the chromosome [29, 61]. The MEP chromosome is interpreted into 
a computer program in a top down manner. A terminal gene specifies a simple expression. A function 
gene specifies an expression obtained by connecting the operands specified by the argument positions 
with the function symbol. An example to explain the initial population generation process is provided 
below and Figure 2.10 illustrates the genes within the chromosome expressed as trees. 
The numbers on the left represent gene positions. 
Function Set (F) = {+, *, -, /, sin}, 
Terminal Set (T) = {a, b, c}. 
An example of an individual using the sets F and T is given below: 
1: a 
2: b 
3: + 1, 2 
4: sin (2) 
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5: c 
6: - 5, 1 
7: / 2, 3 
8: / 2, 6 
9: * 8, 4 
10: - 7, 8 
11: + 1, 9 
Genes 1, 2 and 5 encode simple expressions formed by a single terminal symbol. These expressions 
are: 
  E1 = a, 
  E2 = b, 
  E5 = c. 
Gene 3 applies the operation + to the operands located at 1 and 2 of the chromosome. 
  E3 = a + b 
Gene 4 applies the operation sin to operands located at 2. 
  E4 = sin (b) 
Gene 6 applies the operation – to the operands located at 5 and 1. 
  E6 = c – a 
Gene 7 applies the operation / to the operands located at 2 and 3. 
  E7 = b / (a + b) 
Gene 8 applies the operation / to the operands located at 2 and 6. 
  E8 = b / (c – a) 
Gene 9 applies the operation * to the operands at 8 and 4 of the chromosome. 
  E9 = b / (c – a) * sin(b) 
Gene 10 applies the operation - to the operands at 7 and 8 of the chromosome. 
  E10 = b / (a + b) - b / (c - a) 
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Gene 11 applies the operation + to the operands at 1 and 9 of the chromosome. 
  E11 = a + b / (c - a) * sin (b) 
 
 
Figure 2.10: MEP chromosome genes represented as trees 
 Genetic Operators 
This section provides a description of the various genetic operators and how they are applied within 
MEP. The operators preserve the structure of the chromosome and the offspring produced are 
syntactically correct expressions. Each of the parents are selected using the same selection methods 
described for standard genetic programming in section 2.7. 
2.25.1 Crossover 
During crossover two parents are selected and recombined. Crossover operations change gene 
material between selected parents. Three variants of crossover have been used in MEP 
implementations: one-point, two-point and uniform crossover. 
One-point crossover randomly selects a crossover point and the parent chromosomes exchange 
the genes that appear after the crossover point. Figure 2.11 illustrates one-point crossover. The 
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crossover point is position 4. The genes from 4 onwards are exchanged between the parents to 
generate the offspring. The highlighted genes illustrate the changes between the parents. 
Parents  Offspring 
P1 P2  O1 02 
1: b 1: a  1: b 1: a 
2: * 1, 1 2: b  2: * 1, 1 2: b 
3: + 2, 1 3: + 1, 2  3: + 2, 1 3: + 1, 2 
4: a 4: c  4: c 4: a 
5: * 3, 2 5: d  5: d 5: * 3, 2 
6: a 6: + 4, 5  6: + 4, 5 6: a 
7: - 1, 4 7: * 3, 6  7: * 3, 6 7: - 1, 4 
Figure 2.11: MEP one-point crossover 
Two-point crossover randomly selects 2 points and genetic material is exchanged between the 
chromosomes. Figure 2.12 illustrates two-point crossover with crossover points at positions 3 and 5. 
The genes between 3 and 5 inclusive are exchanged between the parents. 
Parents  Offspring 
P1 P2  O1 02 
1: b 1: a  1: b 1: a 
2: * 1, 1 2: b  2: * 1, 1 2: b 
3: + 2, 1 3: + 1, 2  3: + 1, 2 3: + 2, 1 
4: a 4: c  4: c 4: a 
5: * 3, 2 5: d  5: d 5: * 3, 2 
6: a 6: + 4, 5  6: a 6: + 4, 5 
7: - 1, 4 7: * 3, 6  7: - 1, 4 7: * 3, 6 
Figure 2.12: MEP two-point crossover 
Uniform crossover randomly selects genes and exchanges these between the parents to generate 
offspring as illustrated in Figure 2.13 
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Parents  Offspring 
P1 P2  O1 02 
1: b 1: a  1: a 1: b 
2: * 1, 1 2: b  2: * 1, 1 2: b 
3: + 2, 1 3: + 1, 2  3: + 2, 1 3: + 1, 2 
4: a 4: c  4: c 4: a 
5: * 3, 2 5: d  5: * 3, 2 5: d 
6: a 6: + 4, 5  6: + 4, 5 6: a 
7: - 1, 4 7: * 3, 6  7: - 1, 4 7: * 3, 6 
Figure 2.13: MEP uniform crossover 
2.25.2 Mutation 
During mutation in order to maintain syntactically correct programs, the first gene must encode a 
terminal symbol. The mutation operator is applied to the genes within the chromosome. A random 
number of genes in the chromosome are selected for mutation. If a terminal gene is selected for 
mutation, it may be changed to another terminal symbol or to a randomly created function gene. If a 
function gene is selected for mutation, the gene may be mutated to a terminal symbol or the function 
arguments are altered to point to other genes.  
Parent  Offspring 
1: b  1: b 
2: * 1, 1  2: * 1, 1 
3: b  3: + 1, 2 
4: * 2, 2  4: * 2, 2 
5: b  5: b 
6: + 3, 5  6: + 1, 5 
7: a  7: a 
Figure 2.14: MEP Mutation 
In the example (Figure 2.14) above gene 3 and 6 were randomly selected for mutation. Gene 3 
changed from a terminal symbol to a function, with randomly created function arguments. The 
mutation operator was applied to gene 6 and one of the function arguments where altered. The 
function arguments mutated always point to lower positions than the function position. 
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 Introns and Modularisation 
Introns within MEP are the genes which are not used within the chromosome. These genes have no 
effect on the fitness of an individual. Introns are helpful if they reduce the destructive effects of 
genetic operators. Modularisation methods such automatically defined functions can be used to 
reduce introns. 
Automatically Defined Functions (ADF) have been implemented in a MEP context as reusable 
subroutines. An ADF in MEP maintains the same structure as a MEP chromosome and it is made up of 
a number of genes. The function symbols used for an ADF in MEP are the same as the ones used for 
standard MEP and the terminal symbols within ADFs are restricted to terminal symbols defined only 
for ADF’s and hence terminal symbols of standard MEP chromosomes cannot be used with ADF 
structures [61].  
 Strengths and Weakness of MEP 
Since a single MEP gene within a chromosome is closely related to a standard GP individual, MEP 
benefits from the same strengths standard GP possesses. Some strengths and shortcomings specific 
for MEP are discussed below. 
2.27.1 Strengths 
• Multiple expressions within the same individual can be used to represent the best solution as 
well as explore a bigger search space as compared to single expressions. 
2.27.2 Weaknesses 
• High computational effort since multiple expressions are encoded within a single individual. 
• Duplicate expressions within an individual can be found.  
 Chapter Summary 
This chapter described genetic programming and some of its variant’s grammatical evolution and 
multi-expression programming. An overview of the genetic programming algorithm was provided. 
Aspects of the GP algorithm: representation, initial population generation, evaluation, selection 
methods, genetic operators, control methods and termination criteria were included in this chapter. 
Introns and bloat which increases the time taken for evaluation were discussed. The strengths and 
shortcoming of genetic programming were provided in this chapter. Grammatical evolution, a variant 
of genetic programming was introduced in this chapter. The generational control model in the context 
of grammatical evolution was described. Representation and the mapping process within grammatical 
evolution was discussed. A description of genetic operators applied within grammatical evolution was 
provided as well as the strengths and weaknesses of grammatical evolution were discussed in this 
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chapter. Multi-expression programming, another variant of genetic programming was introduced in 
this chapter.  An overview of multi-expression programming using the steady state control model was 
provided in this chapter. The representation, initial population generation and evaluation of 
individuals in multi-expression programming were discussed in this chapter. Various genetic operators 
applied in multi-expression programming as well as the strengths and weaknesses of multi-expression 
programming were provided in this chapter. This chapter has provided a foundation of the different 
approaches that will be used throughout this thesis.  
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3 Network Intrusion Detection 
 Introduction 
This chapter firstly introduces intrusion detection, Section 3.2 outlines the network intrusion detection 
process, network intrusion datasets are discussed in section 3.3, details of performance measures 
used in network intrusion detection are provided in section 3.4, previous work on network intrusion 
detection is discussed in section 3.6. Section 3.7 provides a summary of the chapter. 
Since the inception of networks and the internet, computer security has become a fundamental 
aspect of ensuring information and access to information is kept as secure as possible. Computer 
security is the process of preventing and detecting unauthorised access to information. Computer 
security addresses three main aspects of any computer-related system: confidentiality, integrity and 
availability [72]. Various mechanisms such as computer-related attacks compromise computer 
security. These attacks or intrusions put the security of a system at risk. Either internal intruders or 
external intruders initiate intrusions. Internal intruders are entities with authorized permission to 
information but still wish to perform unauthorised activities and external intruders are entities 
without authorised permission but use various techniques to attempt to compromise the security of 
information [45]. Different mechanisms have been introduced to safeguard against intruders and 
unauthorised access to information. Some of the mechanisms include firewalls, access controls and 
encryption. These mechanisms have however failed to fully protect networks and information from 
the increasing evolutions of sophisticated intrusions. As a result, intrusion detection systems have 
become an essential technique to detect intrusions before they inflict widespread damage [89]. 
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring computer systems or networks for signs of intrusions. 
Software which automates the intrusion detection process is referred to as Intrusion detections 
system (IDS) [78]. 
Chapter  3 
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 Network Intrusion Detection 
Network intrusion detection is a classification task that separates normal behaviours of networks from 
attacks [65]. A typical network intrusion detection system (NIDS) should be able to correctly identify 
intrusions within a network as well as ensure it does not identify normal connections within the 
network as possible intrusions [43]. Low time performance and fault tolerance are some of the other 
desired characteristics of a NIDS. Time performance is the total time required by the NIDS to detect 
an intrusion [18]. Figure 3.1 provides an illustration of the NID process. 
Collection of Data Prepare Dataset
Pre-data 
processingTraining Phase
Testing Phase Classifier
 
Figure 3.1: The NID process 
Network information over the monitored network is extracted into a collection of connection 
records containing features such as protocol type, service, flag [10]. The collected records termed a 
dataset, is used to train and develop a classifier. Espejo et al. [22] defined a classifier as “a model 
encoding a set of criteria that allows a data instance to be assigned to a particular class depending on 
the value of certain variables”. Supervised learning is the approach frequently used to induce a 
classifier. Supervised learning involves using a dataset which has records that are labelled with their 
correct classes to induce a classifier which is capable of correctly classifying each record within the 
dataset [22]. In the context of NID, two types of classifiers exist, binary classifiers and multi-class 
classifiers. Binary classifiers distinguish between an attack and a non-attack and multi-class classifiers 
distinguish between different attack classes, i.e. types of attacks. Classification algorithms are 
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techniques that are used to induce classifiers. Examples of classification algorithms include genetic 
programming, genetic algorithms, neural networks and Bayesian networks are examples of classifiers.  
Pre-processing of the dataset such as feature selection is performed if necessary before 
classification takes place. K-fold cross-validation and training and testing are some of the methods 
used to evaluate how well the classifier performs [7].  
Training and testing involve splitting the dataset into two sets, the training set and the testing set. 
Different studies split the dataset differently. Studies in [6, 7] applied a 70/30 split were the training 
set consisted of 70% of the dataset and the testing set consist of the remaining 30%. Records that 
make up the training set or testing set are randomly selected. The training set is used by the 
classification algorithm for developing a classifier. Performance measures are used by the 
classification algorithms to assess the performance of the classifier. After the classifier generated, it is 
evaluated over the testing set to evaluate how well the classifier performs. 
 K-fold cross-validation involves splitting the dataset into k-parts of equal (approximate equal) size. 
The algorithm is run k–times and for each run, one k-part is used as the testing set whilst the other k-
1 parts are used as the training set. If the dataset is not exactly divisible by k, the last k-part will contain 
fewer instances [6, 7].  
 Datasets for Network Intrusion Detection 
The following section provides a description of the supervised machine learning datasets that have 
been widely used in network intrusion detection. The most commonly used datasets in NID are DARPA, 
KDD99 and NSL-KDD. Figure 3.2 provides the relation between the DARPA, KDD99 and NSL-KDD 
datasets. 
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DARPA
Raw TCP/IP Dump Files
KDD99
NSL-KDD
Features Extracted
Duplicates Removed
Size Reduced
Training Size:         6.591.458 kb (6.2gb)
Testing Size:          3.853.522 kb (3.67gb)
Training Size: 4898431 
Testing Size:   311029
Training Size: 125973 
Testing Size:   22544
 
Figure 3.2: Relation between DARPA, KDD99 and NSL-KDD extracted from [65]. 
3.3.1 DARPA 1998 and 1999 
The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agents (DARPA) and the Air Force Research Laboratory 
(AFRL) funded a project for the development of an evaluation dataset for NIDS. This resulted in the 
development of the DARPA 1998 dataset by the MIT Lincoln laboratory [16]. The data that was used 
to develop the dataset was extracted from a simulated network. The dataset is made up of training 
data collected over 5 days of a week from Monday to Friday over a period of 7 weeks and 2 weeks of 
test data of normal and intrusion user data. The dataset contains around 5 million connections with 
each connection approximately 100 bytes in size. Each connection is a sequence of TCP packets which 
flows under a specific protocol from a source IP address to a target IP address [16].  
The dataset set was improved in 1999 to include Windows NT vulnerabilities and stealthier attacks 
resulting in the 1998 DARPA dataset. The 1999 dataset training set data was collected over 3 weeks 
and testing set data was collected over 2 weeks. The data in the datasets weeks one and weeks three 
consist of normal traffic and week two data consists of attacks. The network attack classes that were 
simulated in the DARPA set include Denial of service (DOS), Remote user to local (R2L), Local to Root 
(L2R), Probing and Anomalous behaviours [51]. These network attack classes are discussed in detail in 
section 3.3.4. 
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Some researchers [46, 50, 51] have criticized the dataset because the traffic generation software 
used is not publicly available and hence it is difficult to determine the accuracy of the background 
traffic data presented.  They also questioned the use of simulated data as compared to using real-life 
systems and the use of a specific attacker increased the likelihood of bias in the data recorded. 
3.3.2 KDD Cup 99 
Feature extraction and data pre-processing techniques were performed on the DARPA’99 dataset to 
generate the KDD Cup 99. The KDD was prepared by Lee et al. [44]. The packet information within TCP 
dump files from DARPA was extracted into connections using Bro IDS [71], resulting in 41 features 
representing each connection [92]. The dataset was split into three labelled samples that are used for 
training and testing. The details of each sample are summarized in Table 3.1  
 Attacks Normal Total 
10% KDD 396743 97277 494020 
Whole KDD 3925650 972781 4898431 
Corrected KDD 250436 60591 311027 
Table 3.1: KDD Cup 99 Sample Distribution 
The features representing each connection are made up of 38 continuous or discrete numerical 
attributes and 3 categorical attributes. Each connection is labelled as either normal or a specific 
network attack [26]. The specific network attacks fall into one of the following categories; DOS, Probe, 
R2L and U2R, discussed in section 3.3.4. The dataset contains 24 network attack types in the training 
set and 38 attack types in the testing set. Among the 38 attack types in the testing set, 14 of them do 
not exist within the training set enabling the IDS to test how well it performs on unknown attacks. The 
dataset is heavily imbalanced towards attack connections. Out of 4 898 431 connections which make 
up the whole dataset, 3 925 650 connections are attack records [65]. Table 3.2 shows the attack 
distribution for the training set and testing set. U2R and R2L attack connections within the dataset are 
very few in comparison to the other network attacks.  
Due to the huge size of the datasets, some researchers use smaller portions of the datasets. Some 
researchers have criticized the dataset for containing too many duplicate records within the training 
and testing set which has resulted in the creation of other datasets such as the NSL-KDD dataset [85]. 
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 Training 
Size 
Testing 
size 
Normal 972781 60591 
DOS 3883390 231455 
Probe 41102 4166 
U2R 52 245 
R2L 1106 14570 
Total 4898431 311027 
Table 3.2: KDD Cup Class distribution 
3.3.3 NSL-KDD dataset 
The dataset was proposed by Tavallaee et al. [85] and consists of selected records of the KDD-CUP’99 
dataset [1]. The NSL-KDD (NSL) dataset was created to solve some of the inherent problems of the 
KDD CUP (KDD) dataset. Tavallaee et al. [85] conducted an analysis of the KDD dataset and found 
problems within the KDD dataset. The KDD dataset suffered largely from a vast number of redundant 
records and from the results of the KDD analysis, about 78% and 75% of the records were duplicated 
in both the training and testing set, respectively. A large amount of redundancy within the KDD 
training set causes learning algorithms to be more partial towards the more frequent records as 
compared to infrequent records. Duplication within the testing set will cause the evaluation of 
learning algorithms to be more biased towards better detection rates of frequent records.  
3.3.4 Network Attack Categories 
Simulated attacks within the previously mentioned datasets fall into one of the following categories: 
Denial of Service (DOS), Probe, Remote to Local (R2L) and User to Root (U2R). 
3.3.4.1 Denial of Service Attacks (DOS)  
These are attacks where the attacker denies access to a machine by making the computing resources 
too busy to allow network requests placed by legitimate users. Different varieties of DOS attacks exist, 
some create malformed packets that confuse the system, whilst others take advantage of bugs located 
on particular networks. Smurf and Neptune are examples of applications that perform DOS attacks 
[38]. Distributed DOS (DDoS) attacks have also emerged which are a variant of DOS attacks but instead 
of using a single machine to perform this attack, multiple machines are used [43].  
3.3.4.2 Probing attacks 
When an attacker scans a machine or network in order to determine weaknesses that they might later 
exploit in order to compromise the system. Examples of probe attacks include portsweep and mscan. 
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3.3.4.3 Remote to Local (R2L) attacks 
External intruders who have the ability to send and collect information from a host machine or 
network by exploiting the different vulnerabilities that exist on the network or host mainly initiate 
these attacks. Ftp_write, Guest and Xnsnoop are some examples of R2L attacks which attempt to 
exploit the weak or misconfigured security policies within a network or host machine [38]. 
3.3.4.4 User to Root (U2R) attacks 
The intruder initially starts using the system as a normal user and attempts to abuse the vulnerabilities 
of the system in order to gain higher privileges within the system. Perl and xterm are examples of user 
to root attacks [84]. 
Table 3.3 illustrates categorisation of the attacks that exist in the datasets discussed above. 
Category Network attack type 
 
Denial of Service 
(DOS) 
Back, Land, Neptune, Pod, Smurf, 
Teardrop, Mailbomb, Processtable, 
Udpstorm, Apache2, Worm, Syslogd 
Probe Ipsweep, Nmap, Portsweep, 
Satan, Mscan, Saint 
 
 
Remote to Local 
(R2L) 
Ftp_write, Imap, Multihop, Phf, 
Spy, Warezclient, Warezmaster, 
Guess_passwd, Xlock, Xsnoop, 
Snmpguess, Snmpgetattack, 
Httptunnel, Sendmail, Named, 
Dictionary, Guest 
 
User to Root 
(U2R) 
Buffer_overflow, Loadmodule, 
Rootkit, Perl, Sqlattack, Xterm, 
Ps, Eject, Ffbconfig, Fdformat 
Table 3.3: Network intrusion detection categories and attack types [75] 
 Performance Measures 
Performance measures are used to evaluate the efficiency and quality of a classifier. This section 
describes the performance measures commonly used for network intrusion detection. 
 
43 
 
3.4.1 Confusion matrix 
The performance of a classifier is described using a confusion matrix. The matrix shows how frequently 
instances of a class x were correctly classified as class x or misclassified as some other class [7]. The 
confusion matrix illustrates performance for both binary and multi-class classifiers. The matrix 
illustrates the performance of the classifier using four measures: 
• True Positive (TP) – The number of intrusion connections correctly classified as intrusions 
• True Negative (TN) – The number of normal connections correctly classified as normal. 
• False Negative (FN) – The number of intrusion connections incorrectly classified as normal 
connections. 
• False Positive (FP) – The number of normal connections incorrectly classified as intrusion 
connections. 
 
Table 3.4 illustrates a confusion matrix for two classes (intrusion and normal). 
 Predicted connection label 
Intrusion Normal 
Correct 
connection 
label 
Intrusion True Positive 
(TP) 
False Negative 
(FN) 
Normal False Positive 
(FP) 
True Negative 
(TN) 
Table 3.4: Binary confusion Matrix 
The following sections describe performance measures which make use of information from the 
confusion matrix. 
3.4.2 Accuracy and False Positive Rate 
Accuracy is the proportion of the correctly classified connections amongst the total number of 
connections. Accuracy is calculated using the following formula [7]: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑦𝑦 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) =  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 +  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
False Positive Rate (FPR) measures the proportion of normal connections incorrectly classified over all 
the normal connections.  
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
(1) 
(2) 
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3.4.3 Sensitivity and Specificity 
Sensitivity is the proportion of true positive connections that were correctly classified [82]. It is also 
referred to as Recall or True Positive Rate (TPR). In NID, the metric measures how well the classifier 
detects intrusive connections. Sensitivity provides a more accurate measure of the intrusion detection 
effectiveness of the classifier as compared to the Accuracy.  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 =  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 
Specificity measures the proportion of true negative connections that were correctly classified within 
the dataset [82]. It is also referred to as True Negative Rate (TNR). 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
3.4.4 Precision and F-measure 
Precision measures how well the classifier correctly detects intrusive connections over all the positive 
connections returned by the classifier within the dataset. It is also referred to as the Positive Predictive 
Value (PPV) [7]. 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 
F-Score is the weighted average of precision and recall. It is also referred to as the f-measure. It 
provides a compromise between recall and precision.  
𝐹𝐹_𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 = 2 ∗  𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 
3.4.5 Receiver operating characteristics 
Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) graphs are two-dimensional graphs which provide a visual 
representation of classifier performance. The TP rates are plotted on the y axis and the FP rates are 
plotted on the x axis [24]. They are commonly used for binary classification problems and depict the 
tradeoffs between the benefits (true positive rates) and the costs (false negative rates). Figure 3.3 
provides an example of a ROC graph. 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
 
45 
 
 
Figure 3.3: ROC graph 
From the graph above, classifiers that perform well would be the ones found in the region labelled A, 
these classifiers correctly classify most of the instances. An ideal classifier would be one which 
generates the point (0.0, 1.0) meaning that all the instances are correctly classified. One classifier is 
better than the other if it is to the “north-west” of the others [7]. Classifiers found in the region 
labelled B, tend to have a high rate of false positives and are worse than random guessing which is 
depicted by the diagonal line running from point (0.0, 0.0) to point (1.0, 1.0) [7, 24]. 
 Feature Selection 
Feature selection or attribute selection is defined as “the process of selecting a subset of original 
features according to a certain criteria” [9]. Features within a dataset can be described as either 
irrelevant, redundant or relevant. Irrelevant features are features which have no effect on the 
accuracy of a generated NID classifier. Redundant features consist of features which can be used 
interchangeably and still have the same effect on the performance measure of the classifier. Relevant 
features are features which have a direct effect on the primary objective of a NID classifier [12]. 
Feature selection achieves two main goals, it selects high quality features which help ensure the 
classifier generated retains high accuracy rates and low false positive rates as well as minimize the 
computation required during the generation of classifiers [91]. Dash and Liu [17] provide a study on 
feature selection for classification as well as categorize feature selection based on the generation 
procedures and evaluation functions. 
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 Previous Work on Network Intrusion Detection 
The network intrusion detection domain has been widely researched. Different approaches have been 
used to generate efficient NID classifiers which can accurately allocate specific network connections 
to their appropriate classes. Some of the approaches that have been used are discussed below. These 
approaches were selected using two criteria; either the approach used the same dataset as the work 
presented in this thesis or produced state-of-the-art results. 
3.6.1 Evolutionary Algorithms 
Chittur [11] generated a binary classifier using a genetic algorithm (GA) in order to evaluate if a GA 
can produce classifiers with high accuracy rates. The KDD-99 dataset was used to evaluate the evolved 
classifiers. Chittur used a combination of the sensitivity and false positive rate as a measure of the 
fitness of an individual. The classifier generated performed well obtaining a high sensitivity rate and 
low false positive rate. The results also showed that genetic algorithms are able to produce classifiers 
with high accuracy rates. 
Gong et al. [27] evolved production rules for network intrusion detection. The production rules 
were evolved using a GA. The DARPA dataset was used to evaluate the classifier. The dataset was made 
up of normal connections and two network attacks portsweep and pod. Feature selection was used 
to reduce the number of features. Crossover and mutation were used to produce the offspring. The 
classifier performed fairly well, obtaining a high detection rate for detection of normal connections.  
Hoque et al. [35] generated a multi-class classifier using a genetic algorithm (GA) to efficiently 
detect various classes of intrusions. The classifier was generated using the KDD-99 dataset. False 
positive rate and sensitivity were used to evaluate the overall performance of the classifier. The 
classifier performed well obtaining a high sensitivity rate for detecting DOS attacks as well as obtaining 
a low false positive rate. 
3.6.2 Neural Networks 
Wang et al. [87] generated a classifier using artificial neural networks and fuzzy clustering for multi-
class classification. The KDD-99 dataset was used to evaluate the performance of the classifier. Wang 
et al. compared the performance of the hybrid neural network to other approaches (decision trees, 
back propagation neural networks and naïve Bayes) based on three performance metrics: precision, 
sensitivity and f-measure. The hybrid neural network outperformed the other approaches in terms of 
the three performance metrics. However, it achieved a higher training time as compared to the other 
approaches. 
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Govindarajan and Chandrasekaran [28] applied a hybrid neural network to generate a classifier. 
The classifier generated was a hybrid designed using a radial basis function (RBF) and support vector 
machine (SVM). The NSL-KDD dataset was used to evaluate the performance of the classifier. The 
ensemble was evaluated using the classification accuracy. The study also generated two classifiers, 
one using RBF and another using SVM and compared the three classifiers for performance. The hybrid 
classifier outperformed the other two classifiers obtaining a high classification accuracy. 
Ibrahim et al. [36] implemented a Self-Organization Map (SOM) artificial neural network for 
intrusion detection. The neural network distinguished between normal connections and the attack 
connections. The KDD-99 and the NSL-KDD datasets were used to evaluate the performance of the 
classifiers. The neural network performed well obtaining high accuracy rates for detecting intrusions 
in both the KDD-99 and NSL-KDD datasets. The neural network was also compared to other 
approaches [54, 66, 80] which used the same dataset and it outperformed all the approaches for 
binary classification. 
3.6.3 Bayesian Networks 
Panda et al. [66, 67] generated a naïve Bayes binary classifier for intrusion detection. Naïve Bayes 
classifiers using different data filtering configurations were generated and evaluated for performance. 
The NSL-KDD dataset was used to evaluate the classifiers.  Cross-validation was used to train and test 
the classifier. Sensitivity and false positive rate were used to evaluate the performance of the 
classifier. The classifier using principal component analysis as the filtering approach achieved a higher 
sensitivity rate and lower false positive rate outperforming the other classifiers. 
Mukherjee and Sharma [55] generated a naïve Bayes multi-class classifier for network intrusion 
detection. The NSL-KDD dataset was used to evaluate the evolved classifier. Feature selection was 
performed. Cross-validation was applied for testing the classifiers. The Waikato Environment for 
Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) [31], a toolkit which contains a collection of various algorithms and data 
processing tools was used for the experiments. Accuracy was used to evaluate the performance of the 
classifier. The classifier that was generated with 24 features outperformed the other classifiers 
generated. 
3.6.4 Decision Trees 
Thaseen and Kumar [86] evaluated the performance of several decision tree classification algorithms 
for generating binary classifiers. The classification algorithms include AD tree, C4.5, LAD tree, NB tree, 
random tree, random forest and REPTree. The classifiers generated were evaluated using the NSL-KDD 
dataset.  The experiments for generating the classifiers were performed using WEKA. Feature selection 
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was performed. Accuracy was used to evaluate the performance of the classifiers generated. The 
classifier generated using a random tree classification algorithm obtained the highest accuracy rate 
over the other classifiers. 
Chae et al. [9] generated a classifier using J48 for network intrusion detection. The NSL-KDD dataset 
was used to evaluate the classifiers. Ten-fold cross-validation was used to evaluate how the classifier 
performed. Accuracy was used to evaluate system performance. Several feature selection methods 
were compared and the feature selection method which used 22 out of the 41 features from the 
dataset obtained the highest accuracy rate. 
 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced network intrusion detection and provided a description of datasets used for 
network intrusion detection. Network attack categories were discussed. Performance measures used 
in network intrusion detection were discussed in this chapter. Previous studies in network intrusion 
detection were discussed. 
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4 GP and Network Intrusion Detection 
 Introduction 
This chapter reviews studies that have been conducted using genetic programming and its variants for 
network intrusion detection. Section 4.2 provides an overview of using genetic programming for 
network intrusion detection. Section 4.3 describes studies that have performed binary classification 
for network intrusion detection and section 4.4 reviews previous work where multi-class classification 
for network intrusion detection was performed. The strengths and weaknesses of applying genetic 
programming and its variants for network intrusion detection are provided in section 4.6. Section 4.5 
provides an analysis of genetic programming and its variants for network intrusion detection. The 
chapter is summarized in section 4.7. 
 Using genetic programming for network intrusion detection 
When using genetic programming (GP) for network intrusion detection (NID) the problem is treated 
as a classification problem. The classification problem is viewed as either a binary classification 
problem or a multi-class classification problem. Classification algorithms such as genetic programming 
is used to create a classifier to solve a classification problem. Binary classifiers are generated for binary 
classification problems and multi-class classifiers are generated for multi-class classification problems. 
Binary classifiers are generated to detect whether an intrusion exists or not and multi-class classifiers 
are generated to detect different types of intrusions. A classifier can be represented in the form of a 
rule. Genetic programming is used to evolve a rule and the rule can be in the form of either a logical 
tree or an arithmetic tree or a decision tree or a production rule. Logical trees are made up of logical 
operators such as the OR operator. Arithmetic trees represent mathematical expressions and the 
function set consists of mathematical operators such as +, -, *, / [20]. Decision trees represent the 
features as nodes and the leaf nodes as the classes. Production rules are rules which are used to 
represent classifiers using IF-THEN statements. 
Chapter  4 
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When using GP for multi-class classification problems different methods are used to generate 
multi-class classifiers. Binary decomposition, static range selection and dynamic range selection are 
some of the methods used by GP for performing multi-class classification. 
Binary decomposition [47] decomposes a problem with n-classes into a number of binary 
classification problems. Given a problem with 4 classes (1, 2, 3, 4) and each binary problem having two 
classes a and b, the binary decomposition is performed as follows: 
• In the first problem, a = (1) and b = (2, 3, 4). 
• In the second problem, a = (2) and b = (1, 3, 4). 
• In the third problem, a = (3) and b = (1, 2, 4). 
• In the fourth problem, a= (4) and b = (1, 2, 3). 
When static range selection [47] is used to solve a multi-class problem, each class is defined by 
specific boundary regions. Boundary regions are defined based on the problem domain and possible 
class boundary points. Boundary regions are defined before a GP run. During the GP run, the classifier 
is considered to have classified a connection to a specific class if the output falls within a specific 
boundary region. Given a problem with four classes, the following boundary regions can be used to 
represent the classes: Class 1 = [-infinity, -1], Class 2 = [-1, 0], Class 3 = [0, 1], Class 4 = [1, infinity]. In 
static range selection, each element in the population has the same boundary regions. Dynamic range 
selection is an alternate approach to static range selection, which dynamically allows each element in 
the population to use a different set of class boundary regions. 
 Binary Classification for NID using GP 
This section reviews studies which make use of genetic programming and its variants to evolve binary 
classifiers for NID.  
4.3.1 Genetic Programming 
This section focuses on reviewed studies which evolve binary classifiers using standard genetic 
programming for NID. 
Crosbie and Spafford [15] improved manually created rules using genetic programming. The manually 
created rules were encoded in the initial population.  Crosbie and Spafford’s work was one of the first 
implementations that applied genetic programming for intrusion detection. The authors used their 
own dataset for evaluation. The individuals in the population represented production rules. Each 
individual was comprised of arithmetic operators, conditional operators, logical operators and 
features of the dataset. The fitness function was the number of correctly classified intrusions and non-
intrusions. Crossover was applied during the evolutionary process. Training and testing were used to 
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evaluate the overall performance of the classifier. The classifier designed did not perform well but the 
work provided the foundation for applying genetic programming for intrusion detection. 
Lu and Traore [48] used genetic programming to improve manually created production rules. The 
individuals in the population represented production rules and the initial population was made up of 
the manually created production rules. The DARPA 1998 dataset was used to evaluate the 
performance of the classifier. False positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR) and unknown attack 
detection rate (UADR) were used as fitness functions to evaluate the rules generated. UADR measured 
the rate of detecting unknown attacks. The genetic operators used were mutation, reproduction and 
crossover. The overall performance of the classifiers was measured using accuracy and FPR. The 
classifier performed fairly well achieving an average accuracy rate and FPR of 0.57% and 0.041% 
respectively over the 10000 runs that were performed. 
Yin et al. [90] applied genetic programming to generate a rule-based system to detect intrusions. 
The DARPA 1999 dataset was used for the experiments. The Learning Rules for Anomaly Detection 
(LERAD) presented by Mahoney et al. [50] were used to create the initial rules used by genetic 
programming during initial population generation. The individuals in the population represented 
production rules. The accuracy was used as the fitness function. Crossover and mutation were applied 
to improve existing rules. The overall performance of the classifiers was measured using the number 
of correctly classified intrusions. The classifier designed by Yin et al. outperformed other classifiers 
detecting 84 out of the 148 intrusions obtaining a 54% accuracy. 
Orfila et al. [64] designed an intrusion detection classifier using genetic programming. The classifier 
was compared with the machine learning algorithm C4.5 in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. The 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) Dataset [68] was used to evaluate and compare the 
performance of the classifiers. The individuals in the population represented logical trees. Logical and 
bitwise operators formed the function set whilst the terminal set was comprised of the features of the 
dataset as well as an ephemeral random constant. The fitness of a classifier was calculated as the 
difference between sensitivity and false positive rate multiplied by the accuracy. Crossover was 
applied during the evolutionary process. The authors evaluated the classifiers using cross-validation. 
GP generated more effective rules than C4.5 rules. GP also had simpler solutions with fewer nodes as 
compared to the best individual derived by C4.5. 
Blasco et al. [5] evaluated the performance of classifiers generated using different fitness functions. 
The KDD-99 dataset and a modified version of the KDD-99 were used for the experiments. The 
individuals represented logical trees. The terminal set was composed of the features of the dataset as 
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well as two ephemeral random constants. Two fitness functions were considered for evaluation. The 
first fitness function was the difference between sensitivity and false positive rate whilst the second 
fitness function was a function of the sensitivity, false positive rate as well as the frequency of attacks 
within the dataset. Tournament selection was used as the selection method. Genetic operators 
crossover and mutation were applied during the evolution process. The overall performance of the 
classifiers was measured based on the accuracy. The classifier generated based on the function of 
sensitivity, FPR and frequency of attacks achieved a higher accuracy rate. The classifiers were also 
compared to other classifiers [30] evaluated on the KDD dataset and they outperformed 3 out of the 
6 classifiers compared. 
Pastrana et al. [69, 70] applied genetic programming to generate intrusion detection classifiers. 
The Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) and the KDD-99 dataset were used to evaluate the 
classifiers. The individuals represented logical trees. The features of the datasets formed the terminal 
set. Tournament selection was applied as the selection method. Crossover and mutation were applied 
during the evolutionary process. Cross-validation was used for the experiments that involved the 
LBNL. Training and testing were used for the KDD-99 experiments. FPR was used to measure the 
overall performance of the classifiers. The LBNL and KDD-99 NIDS classifiers performed well obtaining 
an FPR of 4% and 3% respectively. The LBNL classifier was also compared to the classifiers generated 
using C4.5 and naïve Bayes. The LBNL classifier outperformed the other two classifiers obtaining a 
lower FPR. 
4.3.2 Grammatical Evolution 
The study reviewed in this section used grammatical evolution to generate binary classifiers for 
network intrusion detection.  
Sen and Clark [79] applied grammatical evolution to mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). The 
objective of the study was to model a classifier that could detect intrusions on MANETs. The authors 
used their own dataset. The BNF production rules of the grammar were composed of a combination 
of arithmetic operators, binary operators and MANET’s features. Individuals were represented as 
production rules. The difference between the accuracy and the false positive rate was used as the 
fitness function. Mutation and crossover were applied during the evolutionary process. The training 
and testing method was used. The overall performance of the classifiers was measured based on the 
accuracy. The classifier designed achieved high accuracy rates.  
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4.3.3 Linear Genetic Programming 
The work discussed in this section applied linear genetic programming to generate classifiers for 
network intrusion detection. 
Song et al. [83] applied linear genetic programming for network intrusion detection. The KDD-99 
dataset was used to evaluate the performance of the classifier. Linear genetic programming was used 
to represent individuals. The individuals were defined in terms of the number of pages and 
instructions. Three fitness functions were considered for evaluation: equal class cost, variable class 
cost and hierarchical cost. The equal class cost fitness function measured the number of correctly 
classified intrusions and non-intrusions. The variable class cost fitness function favoured infrequent 
classes by assigning a higher weighting to infrequent class detection as compared to frequent classes. 
The hierarchical cost fitness function measured the number of misclassified connections. Tournament 
selection, crossover and mutation were applied during evolution. The overall performance of the 
classifiers was measured based on the accuracy and the false positive rate. Individuals using 
hierarchical cost as the fitness function obtained the best results for both the false positive rate and 
accuracy.  
 Multiclass Classification for NID using GP 
This section reviews work which generated multi-class classifiers for network intrusion detection using 
genetic programming and its variants.  
4.4.1 Genetic Programming 
This sections reviews studies which applied standard genetic programming to generate multi-class 
classifiers for network intrusion detection. 
Faraoun et al. [23] applied genetic programming to perform multi-class classification for network 
intrusion detection. The KDD-99 dataset was used to evaluate the performance of the classifier. The 
individuals represented arithmetic trees. The terminal set was comprised of the features from the 
dataset and constants. The function set contained arithmetic operators. Fitness proportionate 
selection was used as the selection method. Genetic operators crossover and mutation were applied 
during the evolutionary process. The training and testing method was used. The overall performance 
of the classifier was measured based on accuracy and the FPR. The classifier obtained high accuracy 
rates and low false positive rates. The classifier also outperformed other classifiers [21, 44] generated 
using the same dataset. 
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4.4.2 Grammatical Evolution 
This section reviews work which has applied grammatical evolution for generating multi-class 
classifiers for network intrusion detection. 
Wilson and Kaul [88] applied grammatical evolution for automating the generation of intrusion 
detection rules. The KDD-99 dataset was used to evaluate the performance of the classifier. Rank 
selection was used as the selection method. The fitness of the rules was based on a combination of 
the features and the specific output class for each rule. Crossover and mutation were applied during 
the evolutionary process. The classification accuracy was used to evaluate the performance of the 
classifier in detecting the different network attacks. The best classifier evolved achieved a high 
classification accuracy for detecting attacks such as DOS but also achieved very low detection rates 
for other attacks such as R2L attacks.  
4.4.3 Multi-expression Programming 
This section reviews a study which applied multi-expression programming for generating multi-class 
classifiers for network intrusion detection. 
Grosan et al. [29] applied multi-expression programming (MEP) for multi-class classification and 
compared the performance of the classifier generated to linear genetic programming (LGP), support 
vector machines (SVM) and decision trees (DT). The 1998 DARPA dataset was used for classifier 
evaluation. LGP applied tournament selection, crossover and mutation during evolution. The MEP 
individuals represented arithmetic trees.  The MEP function set was comprised of a combination of 
arithmetic and logical operators. The terminal set comprised the 41 features from the dataset. 
Crossover was applied to generate offspring and accuracy was used as the fitness for MEP. The training 
and testing method was used for the experiments and accuracy was used to evaluate the performance 
of the classifiers. MEP outperformed LGP, SVM and DT classifiers for detecting normal, U2R and R2L 
attacks and LGP outperformed the rest of the classifiers in accurately detecting DOS and Probe attacks.  
4.4.4 Linear genetic programming 
Mukkamala et al. [56] investigated the use of linear genetic programming for modelling intrusion 
detection systems. The performance of linear genetic programming (LGP) was compared to support 
vector machines (SVM) and a neural network trained using resilient backpropagation (RBP) learning 
models in terms of scalability, the time it took to train and test the approaches and detection accuracy. 
The DARPA 1998 dataset was used for evaluation. The crossover operator was used to exchange 
sequences of instructions between two tournament winners. For each network attack category, an 
LGP classifier was evolved. LGP outperformed SVMs and RBP in terms of detection accuracies for each 
of the network attack type categories. 
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Hansen et al. [32] applied GP to evolve a classifier for network intrusion detection. The authors 
performed a comparative evaluation of two classifiers: one using standard crossover and the other 
using the homologous crossover operator, in order to determine the best crossover operator to use 
for intrusion detection. The KDD-99 dataset was used to evaluate the classifiers. Mutation and 
crossover were applied. The GP classifier using homologous crossover performed better than the 
standard crossover classifier. Hansen et al. also compared the state-of-the-art approaches with the 
GP classifier using homologous crossover and the classifier performed better than the state-of-the-art 
classifiers for DOS, Probe, U2R and R2L attacks. 
 Strengths and Weaknesses of GP in NID 
This section highlights the strengths and weaknesses of using genetic programming and its variants 
for network intrusion detection.  
4.5.1 Strengths 
• Automatic feature selection 
During the evolution process, the GP run indirectly performs the process of feature selection by 
selecting the best features to use in representing the solution to the problem. This eliminates 
additional feature selection tasks usually performed. 
• Flexibility  
Different representations can be used to represent classifiers for network intrusion detection. 
Quality of classifiers generated can also be improved by using modified fitness functions and 
genetic operators. 
4.5.2 Weaknesses 
• Introns 
Some classifiers generated by GP become very large because of redundant code within the 
classifier. 
 Analysis of genetic programming in network intrusion detection 
From the studies discussed above genetic programming has been widely used to generate classifiers 
for NID. There have been studies which have applied linear genetic programming and from the studies, 
linear genetic programming has been able to achieve high accuracy rates. From the literature, it can 
be seen that a lot of research effort has gone into linear genetic programming which has been able to 
attain high accuracy rates. The work in MEP and GE is still in its initial stages and from the studies 
reviewed, the two approaches tend to show promise of generating classifiers which can achieve high 
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accuracy rates. For the work presented in this thesis, MEP and GE will be investigated for generating 
classifiers for network intrusion detection. Genetic programming will be used to generate classifiers 
to provide a baseline to compare the performance of the classifiers generated by GE and MEP. Binary 
and multi-class classifiers will be generated using each of the approaches.  
From the studies which generated binary classifiers, the accuracy rate has been successfully used 
as the fitness function in order to generate classifiers with high overall accuracies [5, 64, 79, 90]. For 
this study, the accuracy rate will be used as the fitness function for binary classifiers generated using 
the three approaches (GP, GE and MEP). Different fitness functions have been used for generating 
multi-class classifiers for NID. Investigations into the effects of different fitness functions have not 
been conducted and for the study in this thesis, investigations into the use of different fitness 
functions will be conducted in order to determine the effects of fitness functions on the overall 
performance of classifiers generated. Based on work done by Loveard et al. [47], dynamic range 
selection and binary decomposition performed better than other approaches for solving classification 
problems and for the study in this thesis, binary decomposition will be used to generate multi-class 
classifiers for NID. 
In the literature reviewed genetic programming has been widely applied for network intrusion 
detection. Individuals in genetic programming have been represented using arithmetic trees [23], 
production rules [15, 48, 90] and logical trees [5, 64, 69, 70]. Logical trees have been applied more 
frequently and have achieved higher accuracy rates. For this reason, logical trees will be used to 
represent individuals in this study. Tournament selection which has been applied in a number of 
studies [5, 29, 69, 70, 83] which have achieved high accuracy rates will be used in this study. Crossover 
and mutation have been widely used in the studies reviewed in this chapter. In this study, both genetic 
operators will be applied during the evolutionary process.  
Grammatical evolution has been applied in a few studies for network intrusion detection [79, 88]. 
From the reviewed studies on grammatical evolution, production rules have been used to represent 
individuals. Production rules have not been able to achieve a high accuracy rate and for this study, 
logical trees will be used to represent individuals in order to investigate their potential for generating 
classifiers with better accuracy rates. Studies which have used tournament selection, crossover and 
mutation have achieved high accuracy rates and for the study in this thesis, tournament selection, 
crossover and mutation will be used. 
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Multi-expression programming has been applied once for network intrusion detection [29]. For this 
study, using logical trees to represent the individuals will be investigated. Genetic operators crossover 
and mutation will be applied during the evolutionary process for this study. 
Different datasets have been used for network intrusion detection. The KDD-99 dataset has been 
widely used in the literature provided in this chapter compared to the other datasets used for NID. 
The KDD-99 dataset has however been criticized for being outdated and containing redundant records 
[50, 77, 85]. The NSL-KDD [85] dataset was proposed to overcome some of the limitations of the KDD-
99 dataset possessed. In order to overcome the limitations of the KDD-99 dataset the following 
processes were performed on the NSL-KDD: 
- Removal of redundant and duplicate records in both the training and testing sets. 
- Reduction in the number of records in the training and testing sets, eliminating the need to 
randomly select small portions of the data set. 
 
The NSL-KDD dataset offers a streamlined version of the KDD-99 dataset and for the work 
presented in this thesis, the NSL-KDD dataset will be used. The accuracy has been widely used in 
reviewed studies [5, 29, 48, 79, 83, 88, 90] to evaluate the overall performance of the classifiers 
generated. For this study, the accuracy will also be used to evaluate classifier performance. 
 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed genetic programming and its variants for network intrusion. An overview of the 
application of genetic programming for network intrusion detection (NID) was discussed. Previous 
studies which generated binary classifiers for NID using genetic programming and its variants were 
discussed followed by studies which generated multi-class classifiers for NID. An analysis of previous 
work which used genetic programming and its variants for generating classifiers for NID was discussed 
and the strengths and weaknesses of using genetic programming for NID were provided. 
 
 
 
  
 
58 
 
 
5 Methodology 
 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology applied in order to achieve the aims and objectives of the 
study presented in the thesis. Section 5.2 discusses the aims and objectives of this study. Section 5.3  
and section 5.4 discuss the methodologies used to achieve the aims and objectives. Section 5.5 
discusses the details of the dataset including the pre-processing methods applied to the dataset. 
Section 5.6 describes the distributed architecture used for the proposed approaches. Section 5.7 
provides the technical specifications and section 5.8 summaries the chapter. 
 Research Methodology 
Different research methodologies have been used in the field of computer science. Johnson [37] 
suggests four methods namely empiricism, mathematical proof approaches, hermeneutics (formal 
proof techniques) and proof by demonstration which have been used in computer science. Empiricism 
is used to determine the hypothesis validity. it follows a sequence of steps hypothesis, methods and 
results and conclusion. Mathematical proof approaches use formal proofs to reason about the validity 
of a hypothesis given some evidence. It can either be by verification; attempts to establish that some 
good property will hold in a given system, or by refutation.  If a model is created and tested in the 
environment which it is intended to represent, the research methodology is regarded as 
hermeneutics. Proof by demonstration involves designing a system and iteratively refining the system 
based on feedback provided after each iteration cycle until the desired output is achieved or no further 
changes can be made to the system. 
The following section outlines the aims and objectives of the work presented in this thesis as well 
as how each of the objectives will be achieved using the methodology discussed in this chapter. 
5.2.1 Aims and Objectives 
The main aim of this study is to evaluate the different variants of genetic programming, namely 
grammatical evolution and multi-expression programming for evolving network intrusion detection 
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classifiers. Proof by demonstration will be used in order to achieve the aims of this study. The following 
outlines the objectives of the study presented in this thesis.  
• Objective 1: Detecting intrusions using grammatical evolution (GE) 
• Objective 2: Classifying network attack types using GE 
• Objective 3: Detecting intrusions using multi-expression programming (MEP)  
• Objective 4: Classifying network attack types using MEP 
• Objective 5: Detecting intrusions using genetic programming (GP) 
• Objective 6: Classifying network attack types using GP 
• Objective 7: Comparative analysis of GE, MEP and GP for network intrusion detection 
Two methodologies will be used in order to achieve the objectives outlined above. Objectives 1 to 6 
will be fulfilled using the methodology discussed in section 5.3 (methodology one) and objective seven 
will be fulfilled using the methodology discussed in section 5.4 (methodology two). 
 Proof by Demonstration Methodology 
Proof by demonstration will be used as the methodology. An initial approach will be implemented 
based on the critical analysis of the literature discussed in section 4.6. The approach will be iteratively 
refined if the approach is not performing well enough when compared to previous literature until a 
termination criterion has been met. During iterative refinement, the approach will be evaluated by 
testing the performance of the implementation on the dataset. If the implementation is not 
performing well based on the evaluation, the implementation is refined until the desired output is 
achieved. The algorithm for proof by demonstration is outlined in Algorithm 5.1 and the following 
sections discuss how each of the steps in the algorithm will be achieved. 
Proof by demonstration 
Begin 
• Implement initial approach 
• Repeat 
o Evaluate the approach. 
o Refine approach (if necessary). 
• Until a termination criterion is met. 
End 
Return implemented approach. 
Algorithm 5.1: Proof by demonstration 
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5.3.1 Evaluation of approach 
Training and testing will be used to evaluate the performance of the approach. The approach will be 
evaluated on the datasets described in section 5.5. Due to the stochastic nature of genetic 
programming and its variants, multiple runs of the proposed approaches will be performed. Thirty 
runs will be performed on the training dataset. A random seed will be used for each of the runs 
performed. The classifier with the highest fitness from the 30 runs will be considered the best 
classifier. The best classifier will be run on the test dataset in order to evaluate the overall 
performance of the approach. Accuracy will be used to evaluate how well the approach performs. 
5.3.2 Refinement of approach 
During the refinement of the approach different aspects of the approach will be changed in order to 
improve the performance of the approach. Aspects of the approach that will be changed include: 
• Parameter values 
A combination of different parameter values affects the performance of the approach. Parameters 
values such as the maximum tree depth of an individual have an overall effect on the generation of 
efficient classifiers and the population size which controls the number of individuals created has an 
effect on the chances of the approach finding a global optimum classifier for network intrusion 
detection. Changes in parameter values have to be performed in order to increase the performance 
of the implementation. Parameters that will be changed include the population size, application rates 
of the genetic operators, the maximum number of generations, maximum tree depth, BNF grammar 
and the number of genes in a MEP chromosome. 
• Representation of individuals 
Different representations have different effects for the generation of classifiers. Changes in the 
representation of individuals may lead to the generation of efficient classifiers. Logical trees will be 
tested in order to evaluate the best representation. 
• Fitness Function 
Fitness functions have an effect on the overall performance of implementations. Different fitness 
functions will direct the approach to different areas of the search space. 
 
• Selection Method 
The choice of selection method has an effect on the overall performance of an approach. Tournament 
selection has been widely used in the literature. Selection pressure has an effect on tournament 
selection. Selection pressure, which is the degree to which high accuracy classifiers are favoured has 
an effect on the convergence rate of an approach. 
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• Genetic Operators 
Genetic operators generate offspring of different shapes and sizes. Different genetic operators are 
used to explore different areas of the search space and changes in the genetic operators applied may 
lead to the generation of high accuracy classifiers. 
5.3.3 Termination Criterion 
The termination criteria of the methodology will be met when one of the following is achieved: 
• No further improvements in the performance of the classifiers were achieved. 
• Performance of the classifier is better than existing implementations from literature. 
 Statistical Tests 
The statistical significance of each of the approaches will be evaluated. More than 30 runs will be 
performed for each experiment using the previous methodology in order to obtain a normal 
distribution which will be used to perform statistical tests. 
5.4.1 Statistical Testing 
Hypothesis tests will be used to test for the significance of the results when comparing the different 
variations of genetic programming to evolve classifiers. A one-tailed hypothesis test (Z-test) will be 
used for the work presented in this thesis, to determine the statistical significance of results obtained 
when comparing different approaches. Table 5.1 provides the level of significance, critical values and 
decision rules for the Z-test. Assume two classification approaches, A and B are being compared, with 
means µA and µB respectively. In order to apply the Z-test, the first step is to formulate the null 
hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis as follows: 
H0 : µA = µB 
Ha : µA > µB 
The value of Z is calculated and compared to the critical value. If the Z-value is less than the critical 
value, there is no statistical significance in comparing the means resulting in the null hypothesis (H0) 
being accepted. If the Z-value is greater than the critical value, there is a statistical difference between 
the two means resulting in the alternate hypothesis being accepted (Ha). 
Significance (α) Critical Value Decision Rule 
0.01 2.33 Accept H0 – if Z < 2.33 
0.05 1.64 Accept H0 – if Z < 1.64 
0.1 1.28 Accept H0 – if Z < 1.28 
Table 5.1: Z-hypothesis test table showing levels of significance, critical values and decision rules 
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 Dataset 
This section describes the datasets that will be used for the work presented in this thesis. This section 
will also provide the pre-processing steps that will be applied to the datasets.  
5.5.1 Dataset description 
Datasets which have been used in network intrusion detection have been discussed in section 3.3. The 
NSL-KDD dataset will be used for the work presented in this study based on the critical analysis of the 
previous work discussed in section 4.6. 
The KDD Train+ set from the NSL-KDD dataset will be used for training and modelling the classifiers. 
The KDD Test+ set will be used to test the performance and effectiveness of the modelled classifiers. 
Table 5.2 provides the distribution of network attack categories and the total number of connections 
for each sample. 
 Normal U2R DOS R2L Probe Total 
KDD Train+ 67343 52 45927 995 11656 125973 
KDD Test+ 9711 67 7460 2885 2421 22544 
Table 5.2: NSL-KDD sample distribution 
5.5.2 Dataset Pre-processing 
Data pre-processing transform data into a format that will be easier and more effective to use for the 
purpose of the study. The NSL-KDD contains a combination of nominal and numeric values in the 41 
features that make up the dataset. Data preprocessing will be applied to the dataset in order to refine 
the dataset and make it easier to use for this study. Data transformation and normalization will be 
performed on the dataset based on previous work [4, 28, 36]. 
5.5.2.1 Data transformation 
Data transformation involves converting all the nominal feature values to distinct numerical values. 
For each of the nominal features (Protocol_type, Service and Flag), the distinct elements for each 
feature will be mapped to distinct numerical values [4, 36]. Table 5.3 provides the feature name and 
the mapped numerical value. 
Feature Feature Name Numerical 
Value 
 
Protocol_Type 
TCP 0 
UDP 1 
ICMP 2 
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Flag 
S0 0 
S1 1 
S2 2 
S3 3 
SF 4 
SH 5 
OTH 6 
REJ 7 
RSTR 8 
RSTO 9 
RSTOS0 10 
Service All services 0 to 69 
Table 5.3: Data transformation 
5.5.2.2 Dataset normalization 
Connections within the dataset contain varying ranges. The numerical values will be scaled using the 
min-max method of normalisation [36]. Each attribute will be scaled to fall within the range [0, 1], 
which is consistent with reviewed studies that have used the NSL-KDD dataset [4, 28, 36]. 
𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑋𝑋 − 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 
5.5.3 Binary classification dataset 
The NSL-KDD dataset was prepared for binary classification by setting all the intrusive connections as 
one class and the normal connections as another class. The KDD Train+ subset of the NSL-KDD will be 
used as the training set and the KDD Test+ will be used as the testing set. Figure 5.1 provides the 
distributions of connections within the binary dataset that will be used for the study presented in this 
thesis. 
(7) 
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Figure 5.1: Binary classification distribution 
5.5.4 Multi-class classification dataset 
The attack class for each connection in the dataset which will be used for the experiments presented 
in this thesis were converted from the specific network attack to the network attack category 
presented in Table 3.3. The KDD Train+ subset of the NSL-KDD will be used as the training set and the 
KDD Test+ will be used as the testing set. Figure 5.2 provides the distribution of attacks within the 
training and testing sets of the NSL-KDD dataset.  
 
Figure 5.2: Multi-class Classification distribution 
 Distributed Architecture for Proposed Approaches 
Genetic programming has high runtimes when evolving classifiers and in order to reduce the high 
runtimes associated with GP, a multicore architecture will be applied. The multicore architecture will 
be applied during the training phase of the proposed approaches described in this thesis. Two 
6734358630
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processes, initial population generation and creation of the new population, are distributed because 
that is where mainly high runtimes are experienced.  
The process of creating the initial population and evaluation of the population is distributed over 
the architecture by dividing the number of individuals created over the number of cores. If n 
individuals are to be generated initially and t cores are available, each core will generate 𝑛𝑛
𝑡𝑡
 individuals 
in parallel. For instance, if the population size is 200 and 8 cores are allocated, each of the 8 cores will 
generate 25 individuals in parallel.  
Similarly, the creation of the new population for each generation (regeneration) is distributed over 
the architecture by dividing the number of individuals created by each of genetic operators over the 
number of cores. For instance, if two genetic operators are used with 8 cores and each genetic 
operator has an application rate of 50% and a population size of 200, 25 individuals will be generated 
on each of the 8 cores. 
 Technical Specifications 
The algorithms proposed in this dissertation were written in Java 1.8 using NetBeans 8.1. The technical 
specifications of the computer used to develop the proposed algorithms were as follows: Intel(R) Core 
(TM) i7-3770S Quad Core @ 3.10GHz with 8GB RAM running 64bit Windows 7. Statistical tests were 
performed using Microsoft Excel 2016. The simulations were performed on the Centre for High-
Performance Computing Lengau cluster. 
 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the methodology used to achieve the aims and objectives outlined in chapter 
1. Methodologies that will be used to achieve the objectives have been discussed. The dataset that 
will be used to evaluate the performance was described as well as dataset pre-processing which will 
be performed. This chapter concludes by providing a description of the distributed architecture for 
the proposed approaches and the technical specifications.  
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6 Genetic Programming for Network 
Intrusion Detection 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the proposed genetic programming approach for network intrusion detection. 
Section 6.2 provides an overview of the algorithm used for the proposed approach. The initial 
population generation is discussed in section 6.3. The evaluation process of an individual is detailed in 
section 6.4. Section 6.5 discusses the selection methods and genetic operators. The parameters used 
are presented in section 6.6 and section 6.7 summarizes the chapter. 
 GP Algorithm 
The generational control model is used for the genetic programming approach presented in this 
chapter. An initial population is created and evaluated. The parent(s) used for genetic operators are 
selected using tournament selection. The genetic operators generate offspring. The offspring is 
evaluated and forms part of the new population. The algorithm repeats until the maximum number 
of generations is reached. Algorithm 2.1 provides an overview of the algorithm. The best classifier 
returned is evaluated on the testing set using accuracy in order to evaluate how well the classifier 
performs. 
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 Representation and initial population generation 
Each individual in the population is a logical tree representing a classifier. The terminal set is composed 
of the 41 features from the NSL-KDD dataset. The function set is made up of nine functions (and, not, 
or, equal, different, max, min, greater, least). The functions were selected based on the critical analysis 
of previous literature in section 4.6. Figure 6.1 illustrates the representation of an individual and Table 
6.1 provides descriptions of the functions in the function set. 
Function Description Arity 
AND Performs the logical AND operation between two values 2 
NOT Performs the logical NOT operation on a single value 1 
OR Performs the logical OR operation between two values 2 
EQUAL Compares two values and returns 1 if two numbers are the same, otherwise, 
0 is returned. 
2 
GP Algorithm 
Begin 
• Create an initial population 
• Repeat 
o Evaluate individuals in the population. 
o Select parents using tournament selection. 
o Apply genetic operators to selected parents. 
o Insert offspring into new population. 
• Until a maximum number of generations. 
End 
Return the best individual and evaluate on the testing set. 
Algorithm 6.1: GP Algorithm 
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DIFFERENT Compares two values and returns 1 if two numbers are different, otherwise, 
0 is returned. 
2 
MAX Compares two values and returns the maximum of the two values. 2 
MIN Compares two values and returns the minimum of the two values. 2 
GREATER Compares two numbers and returns 1 if the first number is greater than the 
second number, otherwise, 0 is returned. 
2 
LEAST Compares two numbers and returns 1 if the first number is lower than the 
second number, otherwise, 0 is returned. 
2 
Table 6.1: Function descriptions 
OR
OR
38 MAX
7 OR
40 9
OR
24 26
 
Figure 6.1: Example of an individual 
The individual in Figure 6.1 is made up of five functions from the function set, each with an arity of 
2. The numbers in the individual represent the feature numbers from the dataset. Each element in the 
individual is randomly selected beginning with the root node (highlighted node). 
The ramped half-and-half method discussed in section 2.5.3 is used for initial population 
generation. The initial population is generated based on the parameters provided in Table 6.3 and 
Table 6.4.  
 Evaluation 
The NSL-KDD training set discussed in section 5.5 is used in the training and generation of the 
classifiers. The training set is used to calculate the fitness of each individual in the population. The 
connections in the training set are the fitness cases discussed in section 2.6.1. Each individual in the 
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population is interpreted and evaluated to produce a single value representing the fitness of the 
individual. Each individual in the population evaluates to either a 0 or 1. 
In order to interpret each individual in the population, each individual cases is applied to the fitness 
cases to produce a predicted class. The variable representing the features in the individuals are 
replaced with the actual values in the fitness case. Each of the functions in the individuals are 
evaluated in a bottom-up manner until all the functions in the individual are evaluated and a single 
value is produced. Figure 6.2 illustrates the interpretation of the individual in Figure 6.1. The following 
is a fitness case which will be used to illustrate the interpretation process. Each feature value is 
separated by a comma and the last single value in the fitness case represents the actual class output. 
0.00,0.50,0.80,0.40,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0
.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1.00,0.00,0.00,0.59,0.10,0.17,0.03,0.17,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.05,0.
00,0 
Each Interpretation is performed in a bottom-up manner beginning by replacing each of the feature 
numbers with the actual values from the fitness cases and then evaluating each function until all the 
functions are evaluated and a single value is returned. Using the fitness case above, the individual in 
Figure 6.1 evaluates to a single value of 0 which represents the predicted class.  
 
70 
 
OR
OR
0.00 MAX
0.00 OR
0.05 0.00
OR
0.00 0.00
Replace feature number with 
actual values from fitness case
1  
OR
OR
0.00 MAX
0.00 OR
0.05 0.00
OR
0.00 0.00
OR operation on values 0.05 and 0.00 
Replaced with 0
2
OR
OR
0.00 MAX
0.00 0
OR
0.00 0.00
Returns the higher value between 0.00 and EVALUATION 1 
(EVALUATION 2)
3
OR
OR
0.00 0
OR
0.00 0.00
OR operation on 0.00 and EVALUATION 2 
(EVALUATION 3)
4
OR
0 OR
0.00 0.00
OR operation on 0.00 and 0.00 
Replaced with 0
5
OR
0 0
OR operation on EVALUATION 3 and EVALUATION 4 
(EVALUATION 5) resulting in a single value of 0
6  
Figure 6.2: Evaluation process 
The output from the individual represents the predicted class. The predicted class is compared to 
the actual class of each of the fitness cases. Based on the results of the comparisons a confusion matrix 
discussed in section 3.4.1 is constructed. Table 6.2 provides an example of the confusion matrix 
constructed for the individual in Figure 6.1 after the individual is evaluated over the training set. 
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 Predicted Class 
Intrusion Normal 
Actual 
Class 
Intrusion 40367 (TP) 18263 (FN) 
Normal 16887 (FP) 50456 (TN) 
Table 6.2: Confusion Matrix 
  Based on the results from the confusion matrix, the fitness of an individual is calculated using one 
of the performance measures described in section 3.4. Different performance measures will be 
compared as fitness measures. 
 Selection Method and Genetic Operators 
Selections methods have been discussed in section 2.7. Tournament selection is used as the selection 
method and it is outlined in Algorithm 6.2. Individuals are randomly selected from the population. The 
number of individuals selected is determined by the tournament size. The individual with the best 
fitness in the tournament is returned as the tournament winner. 
Mutation and crossover discussed in section 2.8.2 were used to generate offspring. These genetic 
operators have been widely used in previous studies. Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 illustrates the genetic 
operators crossover and mutation.  
Tournament selection 
• Randomly select t (tournament size) individuals from the population creating sample.  
• Set first individual in sample as best individual (b). 
• Repeat 
o Compare the fitness of b with individuals in sample. 
o If fitness of individual in sample is higher than fitness of b, set b equal to individual 
with higher fitness. 
• Until all individuals in sample have been compared for fitness. 
Return the best individual. 
Algorithm 6.2: Tournament selection 
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In crossover, random crossover points are selected in each of the two parents selected using 
tournament selection. The subtrees located at the crossover points were exchanged between the two 
parents generating the offspring. In Figure 6.3 the highlighted nodes represent the crossover points. 
OR
OR
38 MAX
7 OR
40 9
OR
24 26
EQUAL
LEAST
NOT
NOT
8
4
OR
24 40
Crossover 
point
Parent 1 Parent 2
 
OR
OR
38
OR
24 26
EQUAL
LEAST
NOT
NOT
8
4
MAX
7 OR
40 9
OR
24 40
Offspring 1 Offspring 2
 
Figure 6.3: GP Crossover 
For mutation, a random mutation point is selected in the parent. A randomly generated tree is 
generated using the grow method of initial population generation. After the random tree is generated, 
it replaces the subtree at the mutation point of the parent generating the offspring. The mutation 
point is highlighted in both the parent and offspring in Figure 6.4. 
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3 21
Offspring
 
Figure 6.4: GP Mutation 
 Parameters 
The parameters used for the generation of binary classifiers are provided in Table 6.3. These 
parameters were determined empirically through multiple trial runs. 
GP Parameter Value 
Population size 200 
Initial population generation method Ramped half and half 
Initial population maximum tree size 4 
Selection method Tournament with a size of 20 
Fitness function Accuracy 
Mutation application rate 50% 
Crossover application rate 50% 
Maximum mutation depth 3 
Maximum offspring depth 8 
Maximum number of generations 500 
Table 6.3: GP Parameters for binary classifiers 
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The parameters summarised in Table 6.4 were used during the generation of multi-class classifiers. 
These parameters were determined empirically through multiple trial runs. Different fitness functions 
were used in order to evaluate the performance of the classifiers.  
GP Parameter Value 
Population size 200 
Initial population generation method Ramped half and half 
Initial population maximum tree size 4 
Selection method Tournament with a size of 10 
Fitness functions Accuracy 
F-Score 
Matthews correlation coefficient 
False positive rate 
Precision  
True positive rate 
Mutation application rate 60 
Crossover application rate 40 
Maximum mutation depth 3 
Maximum offspring depth 8 
Maximum number of generations 500 
Table 6.4: GP Parameters for multi-class classifiers 
 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the proposed GP approach for generating binary and multi-class classifiers for 
network intrusion detection using genetic programming. An overview of the GP algorithm used for the 
generation of the classifiers was outlined. Representation of individuals, evaluation, selection 
methods and the genetic operators used for generating the classifiers were discussed. The parameters 
that were used for the generation of the classifiers were also provided. 
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7 Grammatical Evolution for Network 
Intrusion Detection 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter describes a grammatical evolution approach for generating binary and multi-class 
classifiers for network intrusion detection. Section 7.2 discusses the representation of individuals and 
the grammar used for generating the classifiers. The initial population generation and evaluation is 
discussed in section 7.3. Genetic operators and the selection method that will be used are discussed 
in section 7.4. Section 7.5 provides the parameters for the proposed approach and section 7.6 
concludes the chapter.  
 Representation 
The GE algorithm discussed in section 2.15 is used for the generation of the classifiers described in this 
chapter. The best individual evolved will be evaluated on the testing set of the NSL-KDD dataset. Each 
individual is made up of multiple binary strings. Eight-bits are used to represent a binary string. Each 
bit in the binary string is randomly selected to be either 0 or 1. The following are examples of randomly 
created binary strings representing an individual: 
01010010 10100001 00011100 00011111 11111001 01000101 11100001 
The grammar is described below. 
R = {N, T, S, P} 
Where 
N = {exp, op}  
T = {and, not, or, equal, different, max, min, greater, least, 1 … 41}  
Chapter  7 
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S = {<op> <exp> <exp>} 
Production rules (P) are: 
(1)  <exp> ::=  <op> <exp> <exp>  (0)  
|  <var>    (1)  
(2)  <op> ::=  AND    (0)  
|  NOT    (1)  
|  OR    (2)  
|  EQUAL    (3)  
|  DIFFERENT   (4)  
|  MAX    (5)  
|  MIN    (6)  
|  GREATER   (7)  
|  LEAST    (8)  
(3)  <var> ::=  attr_1    (0)  
|  attr_2    (1)  
|  …   …  
|  attr_41   (40) 
Each of the productions rules (<exp>, <op> and <var>) map to other variables as illustrated above. 
Each variable in the production rule maps to a numerical value used to distinguish it from other 
variables and the numerical value is also used during the mapping process. The functions contained in 
the production rule <op> perform the same functions as the ones described in section 6.3 and the 
terminal symbols contained in <var> are the 41 features of the dataset. The variables that are mapped 
from expanding <exp> in production rule (1) are considered as non-terminating symbols and the 
variables in production rules (2) and (3) are considered as terminating symbols. 
 
77 
 
 Initial Population Generation and Evaluation 
Each individual in the population is randomly created as discussed in section 2.17. The number of 
individuals created is determined by the population size. The number of codons determines the size 
of the individual (binary string length).  
Each individual is evaluated by converting the binary strings to denary values and then mapping 
the denary values to an expression tree. The grammar described above is used during the mapping 
process. The expression tree generated after the mapping process is a logical tree. Figure 7.1 illustrates 
conversion of binary strings to denary values. 
Binary strings of 8-bits randomly created. (Number of codons = 9) 
 
01010010 10100001 00011100 00011111 11111001 01000101 11100001 11100101 11111010  
 
Convert each binary string to a denary value 
 
82          161          28          31          249          69          225          229          250           
 
Figure 7.1: Binary to denary conversion 
After the conversion of binary strings to denary values, the mapping process outlined in section 
2.16.2 is applied, generating an expression tree used to calculate the fitness of the individual. Figure 
7.2 illustrates the denary values and the expression tree.  
OR
LEAST
29 MIN
30 27
LEAST
1725
Expression: OR LEAST 29 25 LEAST 17 MIN 30 27
Denary Codons: 82 161 28 31 249 69 225 229 250 47 255 16 114 109 91 193 247 
…
 
Figure 7.2: GE Individual 
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The individual in Figure 7.2 is made up of 18 denary codons which were used in the generation of 
the expression tree. The expression tree is made up of 4 functions and 5 terminal nodes. The OR 
function represents the root node of the expression tree. 
After the expression tree is generated, the expression tree is evaluated on the training set as 
discussed in section 6.5. The fitness of an individual is determined by the fitness of the expression 
tree. After evaluation of the expression tree, the fitness of the expression tree is calculated using one 
of the performance measures described in section 3.4. Accuracy will be used as the fitness function 
for binary classifiers and different performance measures will be compared as fitness functions for 
multi-class classifiers. Analysis of previous literature conducted in Chapter 4.6 has shown that accuracy 
has been successfully applied for generating binary classifiers which achieve high accuracies, and 
different performance measures have been used as fitness functions for generating multi-class 
classifiers with high accuracies and investigations into the effects of different performance measures 
is worth researching.  
 Selection Method and Genetic Operators 
Tournament selection discussed in section 2.7.1 where a single individual is selected from a sample of 
individuals is used as the selection method for the proposed grammatical evolution approach. 
Genetic operators crossover and mutation are applied during the GE run. Bit flip mutation 
discussed in section 2.18.2 is applied as the mutation operator. During bit flip mutation, each bit in 
the individual is inverted (0 is changed to 1 and 1 is changed to 0) generating an offspring. Uniform 
crossover is applied as the crossover operator. Uniform crossover randomly selects alleles within each 
of the parents and swaps them between the parents to generate offspring. Figure 7.3 illustrates 
uniform crossover were alleles at index 1,2,4,5,8 from the first binary string and index 1,4,6,7,8 from 
the second binary string were exchanged between the two parents to generate the offspring. The 
alleles highlighted in grey represent alleles from parent 1 and the alleles highlighted in blue represent 
alleles from parent 2. 
Parent 1   10011010 01010111 …. 
     
Parent 2  10111100 00011101 … 
     
Offspring 1  10111110 01011101 … 
     
Offspring 2  10111000 00010111 .. 
Figure 7.3: GE uniform crossover 
 
79 
 
 Parameters 
The parameters that were used for the generation of the proposed binary classifiers are summarized 
in the Table 7.1. These parameters were determined empirically through multiple trial runs. 
GE Parameter Value 
GE model Generational Model 
Population size 200 
Number of codons [30,100] 
Wrap-over limit 12 
Nonterminal limit 10 
Selection method Tournament with a size of 14 
Fitness function Accuracy 
Mutation application rate 50% 
Crossover application rate 50% 
Maximum number of generations 500 
Table 7.1: GE Parameters for binary classification 
The parameters summarized in the Table 7.2 were used for the GE approach producing the 
proposed multi-class classifiers. These parameters were determined empirically through multiple trial 
runs. The performance measures which will be compared are mentioned as fitness functions. 
GE Parameter Value 
GE model Generational model 
Population size 200 
Number of codons [30,100] 
Wrap-over limit 10 
Nonterminal limit 8 
Selection method Tournament with a size of 8 
Fitness functions Accuracy 
F-Score 
Matthews correlation coefficient 
False positive rate 
Precision  
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True positive rate 
Mutation application rate 40 
Crossover application rate 60 
Maximum number of generations 500 
Table 7.2: GE Parameters for multi-class classification 
 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented a grammatical evolution approach for generating binary and multi-class 
classifiers for network intrusion detection. The grammar used was presented. Genetic operators and 
the evaluation of the individuals were discussed. The parameters which were used in the generation 
of the classifiers were provided.  
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8 Multi-Expression Programming for 
Network Intrusion Detection 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter describes a multi-expression programming approach for generating binary and multi-
class classifiers for network intrusion detection. Section 8.2 provides an overview of the MEP 
algorithm used for the generation of the proposed classifiers. The representation is discussed in 
section 8.3. Section 8.4 discusses the initial population generation and the evaluation of individuals. 
The selection method and the genetic operators used are discussed in section 8.5. The parameters 
used are provided in section 8.6 and section 8.7 summarizes the chapter. 
 MEP Algorithm 
The generational control model is used. The initial population is created and evaluated. Each individual 
in the population is evaluated using the training set of the NSL-KDD dataset. Tournament selection is 
used to select the parents used for genetic operators. New individuals are generated by the genetic 
operators and form part of the new population. The evaluation and generation of individuals is 
iteratively repeated until the maximum number of generations is reached. The best individual from 
the MEP run is returned and evaluated using the testing set of the NSL-KDD dataset. Algorithm 8.1 
summarizes the MEP algorithm used to generate the classifiers. 
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 Representation 
MEP individuals are made up of genes of variable length as discussed in section 2.23. Each gene within 
an individual is either a terminal gene or function gene. A terminal gene is created whenever a single 
terminal symbol is selected from the terminal set to represent the gene. The terminal set is made up 
of the 41 features from the dataset.  A function gene is created by combining a function symbol from 
the function set and pointers representing other genes within the same individual. The function set is 
made up of nine functions (and, not, or, equal, different, max, min, greater, least). These functions 
perform the same functions as described in section 6.3. Each gene in an individual is similar to an 
individual generated using GP. The number of genes which make up an individual is a MEP parameter. 
Figure 8.1 illustrates an individual with 11 genes and the pointers representing other genes within the 
same individuals. Individuals in the population are logical trees representing classifiers. 
MEP Algorithm 
Begin 
• Create an initial population 
• Repeat 
o Evaluate individuals in the population. 
o Select parents using tournament selection. 
o Apply genetic operators to selected parents to generate offspring. 
o Offspring form new population. 
• Until a maximum number of generations. 
End 
Return the best individual and evaluate on the testing set. 
Algorithm 8.1: MEP algorithm 
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Figure 8.1: MEP Individual 
The individual in Figure 8.1 is made up of 5 terminal genes and 6 function genes. The gene pointers 
illustrate the function arguments used to create each function gene. Gene 7 is a function gene created 
from the combination of gene 3, gene 1 and the MAX function. 
 Initial Population Generation and Evaluation 
The first gene in an individual is a terminal symbol and the rest of the genes in the individual are either 
terminal or function genes as discussed in section 2.24. The number of individuals created during initial 
population generation is determined by the population size.  
In order to evaluate the performance of an individual, each gene in the individual is evaluated using 
the NSL-KDD training set in the same manner as the evaluation of GP individuals discussed in 6.4. After 
each gene is evaluated, the gene with the best fitness represents the overall fitness of the individual.  
 Selection Method and Genetic Operators 
Tournament selection discussed in section 2.7.1 is used as the selection method. From the analysis of 
previous work provided in Chapter 4, tournament selection was widely used in previous literature. 
  Gene       Gene pointer(s) 
gene1   38 
gene2  37 
gene3  MIN 37 38     MIN gene2 gene1 
gene4  MIN 37 MIN 37 38    MIN gene2 gene3 
gene5  36 
gene6  31 
gene7  MAX MIN 37 38 38    MAX gene3 gene1 
gene8  NOT MIN 37 MIN 37 38    NOT gene4 
gene9  EQUAL 38 38     EQUAL gene1 gene1 
gene10  40 
gene11  EQUAL MIN 37 MIN 37 38 MIN 37 38  EQUAL gene4 gene3 
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Genetic operators mutation and crossover are applied during the generation of MEP classifiers. 
Uniform crossover is used as the crossover operator and the mutation operator discussed in section 
2.25.2 is used. Figure 8.2 illustrates uniform crossover applied to a MEP individual. For uniform 
crossover, after genes have been exchanged between the parents, each of the function genes 
exchanged update the function pointers to point to the genes within the individual. For example, for 
the individual in Figure 8.2, gene 2 in parent 2 is expressed as (AND 36 36) evaluating to (AND gene1 
gene1), after the gene is exchanged to form part of offspring 1, it updates its function pointer 
evaluating to (AND 38 38). 
        
 Parent 1 
1. 38 
2. 37 
3. MIN 37 38 
4. MIN 37 MIN 37 38 
5. 36 
6. 31 
7. MAX MIN 37 38 38 
8. NOT MIN 37 MIN 37 38 
9. EQUAL 38 38 
  
          
 Parent 2 
1.  36 
2.  AND 36 36 
3.  29 
4.  28 
5.  LEAST 36 28 
6.  27 
7.  40 
8.  OR LEAST 36 28 36 
9.  MIN 28 40 
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Figure 8.2: MEP Uniform Crossover 
 Parameters 
Table 8.1 lists the parameters that were used for the generation of MEP binary classifiers proposed in 
this chapter. The parameters were determined empirically through multiple trial runs.  
 Offspring 1 
1. 38 
2. AND 38 38 
3. MIN AND 38 38 38 
4. MIN AND 38 38 MIN AND 38 38 38 
5. LEAST 38 MIN 37 MIN 37 38 
6. 31 
7. MAX MIN AND 38 38 38 38 
8. NOT MIN AND 38 38 MIN AND 38 38 38 
9. EQUAL 38 38 
  
                
 Offspring 2 
1.  36 
2.  37 
3.  29 
4.  28 
5.  36 
6.  27 
7.  40 
8.  OR LEAST 36 28 36 
9.  MIN 28 40 
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MEP Parameter Value 
Population size 200 
Number of genes per individual 30 
Selection method Tournament with a size of 15 
Fitness function Accuracy 
Mutation application rate 60% 
Crossover application rate 40% 
Maximum number of generations 600 
Table 8.1: MEP Parameters for binary classification 
The MEP parameters that were used for the generation of multi-class classifiers proposed in this 
chapter are summarized in the Table 8.2. These parameters were determined empirically through 
multiple trial runs. 
MEP Parameter Value 
Population size 200 
Number of genes per individual 30 
Selection method Tournament with a size of 8 
Fitness functions Accuracy 
F-Score 
Matthews correlation coefficient 
False positive rate 
Precision  
True positive rate 
Mutation application rate 40 
Crossover application rate 60 
Maximum number of generations 500 
Table 8.2: MEP Parameters for multi-class classification 
 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the multi-expression programming approach for generating classifiers for 
network intrusion detection. An overview of the algorithm was provided and each aspect of the 
algorithm was discussed. The parameters that were used for the generation of the binary and multi-
class classifiers were provided.  
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9 Results and Discussion  
 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results obtained from applying the proposed approaches presented in this 
thesis for generating binary and multi-class classifiers for network intrusion detection. The following 
summarizes the objectives of the study presented in this thesis outlined in Chapter 1: 
• Develop and analyse the performance of using grammatical evolution for generating intrusion 
detection classifiers.  
• Development and evaluation of applying Multi-expression programming (MEP) for generating 
binary and multi-class classifiers for network intrusion detection.  
• Develop and analyse the performance of using genetic programming (GP) for generating 
binary and multiclass classifiers for network intrusion detection.  
• Investigate the effectiveness of fitness functions for network intrusion detection.  
• Comparative analysis of GE, MEP and GP for network intrusion detection.  
 
Section 9.2 presents the results of applying the proposed grammatical evolution approach 
described in Chapter (GE), Section 9.3 presents the results of applying the proposed Multi-Expression 
Programming approach described in Chapter (MEP) and Section 9.4 presents the results obtained from 
applying the proposed genetic programming approach described in Chapter (GP). Section 9.5 
compares the results for binary and multi-class classifiers presented for each of the approaches 
presented in this thesis. Section 9.6 compares the results of the proposed approaches to state of the 
art approaches for network intrusion detection and section 9.7 summarizes the chapter. 
 
 
Chapter  9 
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 Grammatical Evolution 
This section presents the results obtained by applying the GE approach described in Chapter 7 for 
binary and multi-class classification. 
9.2.1 Binary Classification 
The classifiers that produced best and worst results for detecting intrusions using grammatical 
evolution are presented in Table 9.1. The results in the table represent the accuracy for detecting both 
intrusive and non-intrusive connections during training and testing. The classifier achieved a high 
accuracy of 94.06% during training and 74.55% during testing, a true positive rate of 94.13% during 
training and 60.41% during testing. The classifier achieved a true negative rate of 95.38% during 
training and 86.78% during testing. The classifier achieved a false positive rate of 6.77% during testing 
as compared to 6% achieved during training of the classifier. 
 Training Testing 
Accuracy 
Best classifier 94.06 ± 0.13 74.55 ± 0.24 
Worst classifier 88.93 ± 0.17 73.19 ± 0.24 
Average 91.39 ± 0.15  
Table 9.1: Grammatical Evolution binary classification results 
The average runtime of GE to evolve a classifier was 3 hours during training and evaluation of the 
classifier on the testing set took an average runtime of 30 seconds. 
9.2.2 Multi-class classification 
The subsections below present the results of each of the six performance measures which were used 
as fitness functions for generating multi-class classifiers for network intrusion detection using 
grammatical evolution.  The average runtime of GE to evolve each of the classifiers discussed below 
was 3 hours during training and evaluation of performance on the testing set took an average runtime 
of 20 seconds for each of the classifiers. 
9.2.2.1 Accuracy  
Table 9.2 presents the results of the best and worst classifiers generated from using accuracy as the 
fitness function for generating multi-class classifiers using grammatical evolution. The best classifier 
obtained a low false positive rate of 3.6% during training and 5.5% during testing. High detection rates 
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were achieved for detecting U2R attacks with the best classifier achieving a 90% true positive rate 
during testing and 86.56% during training. 
 
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 95.57 ± 0.11 95.10 ± 0.12 99.97 ± 0.01 99.44 ± 0.04 
Worst 92.80 ± 0.14 90.78 ± 0.16 99.96 ± 0.01 99.21 ± 0.05 
Average 94.30 ± 0.13 92.80 ± 0.14 99.96 ± 0.01 99.27 ± 0.05 
 
 
Testing 
Best 85.33 ± 0.19 92.18 ± 0.15 99.71 ± 0.03 87.21 ± 0.18 
Worst 86.39 ± 0.19 89.27 ± 0.17 99.71 ± 0.03 87.20 ± 0.18 
Average 84.66 ± 0.20 91.68 ± 0.15 99.71 ± 0.03 88.17 ± 0.18 
Table 9.2: Grammatical Evolution accuracy multi-classification results 
The classifiers generated during training achieved similar detecting rates for U2R attacks resulting 
in the similar classification rates during testing for U2R. Probe attacks achieved high detection rates 
during testing despite achieving the lowest detection rates during training.   
9.2.2.2 Matthews coefficient correlation  
The training and testing results of the classifiers that were generated using Matthews’s coefficient 
correlation as the fitness function for multi-class classification using grammatical evolution are 
presented in Table 9.3.   
During training, the best classifier achieved a high accuracy rate and a low true positive rate of 
3%. The false positive rate during testing was higher than training at 5%. Using MCC as the fitness 
function during training and testing resulted in a high average classification rate. The high average 
classification is attributed to the balance between the true positive rate and true negative rate by the 
fitness function. 
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 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 96.21 ± 0.11 95.47 ± 0.11 99.97 ± 0.01 99.21 ± 0.05 
Worst 63.54 ± 0.26 90.75 ± 0.16 99.94 ± 0.01 98.44 ± 0.07 
Average 92.15 ± 0.13 92.94 ± 0.14 99.96 ± 0.01 98.98 ± 0.05 
 
 
Testing 
Best 84.35 ± 0.20 88.94 ± 0.17 99.74 ± 0.02 86.91 ± 0.19 
Worst 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 99.71 ± 0.03 89.11 ± 0.17 
Average 83.56 ± 0.20 90.42 ± 0.16 99.71 ± 0.03 87.15 ± 0.18 
Table 9.3: Grammatical Evolution MCC multi-classification results 
9.2.2.3 F-Score  
Table 9.4 presents the results of the best and worst classifiers generated from applying f-score as the 
fitness function for multi-class classification using grammatical evolution. The best classifier achieved 
a false positive rate of 3.7% during training and 6.34% during testing. The best classifier achieved high 
detection rates with the detection of U2R intrusions achieving above 99% during both training and 
testing. 
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 96.17 ± 0.11 95.10 ± 0.12 99.97 ± 0.01 99.42 ± 0.04 
Worst 92.85 ± 0.14 92.44 ± 0.15 58.63 ± 0.27 80.38 ± 0.22 
  Average 94.45 ± 0.13 92.95 ± 0.14 97.16 ± 0.03 92.64 ± 0.12 
 
 
Testing 
Best 87.54 ± 0.18 92.18 ± 0.15 99.70 ± 0.03 89.26 ± 0.17 
Worst 84.38 ± 0.20 91.93 ± 0.15 46.52 ± 0.27 84.26 ± 0.20 
Average 84.42 ± 0.20 91.35 ± 0.15 96.13 ± 0.05 85.61 ± 0.19 
Table 9.4: Grammatical Evolution f-score multi-classification results 
The best classifier achieved a low detection rate for DOS attacks during testing as compared to 
the detection of all the other intrusive attacks. The average detection rate and the worst performing 
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classifier achieved similar results for detecting DOS attacks. The worst classifier also struggled to 
detect U2R attacks both during training and testing.   
9.2.2.4 True Positive Rate  
The training and testing results of the multi-class classifiers generated using grammatical evolution 
and using the true positive rate as the fitness function are presented in Table 9.5. The classifiers 
achieved low detection rates with the best classifier achieving a detection rate of 39.14% during 
training and 39.44% during testing. The approach (grammatical evolution using TPR as the fitness 
function) achieved the lowest detection rates as compared to the other grammatical evolution 
approaches. The classifiers achieved low detection rates due to the datasets including a large portion 
of normal connections as compared to the intrusive connections. The classifiers correctly classified 
intrusive connections and also achieved a high rate of false positives resulting in a low accuracy of the 
classifiers.  
 
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 39.14 ± 0.27 10.25 ± 0.17 36.21 ± 0.26 28.55 ± 0.25 
Worst 36.46 ± 0.26 9.25 ± 0.16 0.04 ± 0.01 0.79 ± 0.05 
Average 37.08 ± 0.27 9.48 ± 0.16 7.42 ± 0.08 8.88 ± 0.11 
 
 
Testing 
Best 39.44 ± 0.27 11.43 ± 0.18 22.84 ± 0.23 21.74 ± 0.23 
Worst 33.09 ± 0.26 10.74 ± 0.17 0.30 ± 0.03 12.8 ± 0.18 
Average 33.65 ± 0.26 10.91 ± 0.17 7.42 ± 0.08 16.42 ± 0.20 
Table 9.5: Grammatical Evolution TPR multi-classification results 
The best classifier achieved a true positive rate of 67% during training and 70% during testing. The 
rate of true negatives (correct detection of normal connections) was low resulting in high false positive 
rates of 60% during training and 56% during testing. 
9.2.2.5 Precision  
Table 9.6 presents the results of the multi-class classifiers generated using grammatical evolution and 
using precision as the fitness function. The best classifier achieved a false positive rate of 7% during 
training and 14% during testing.  
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 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 64.51 ± 0.26 90.76 ± 0.16 99.96 ± 0.01 99.25 ± 0.05 
Worst 63.54 ± 0.26 90.75 ± 0.16 99.96 ± 0.01 99.21 ± 0.05 
Average 64.20 ± 0.26 90.75 ± 0.16 99.96 ± 0.01 99.21 ± 0.05 
 
 
Testing 
Best 66.34 ± 0.26 89.25 ± 0.17 99.71 ± 0.03 87.37 ± 0.18 
Worst 66.91 ± 0.26 89.15 ± 0.17 99.69 ± 0.03 87.20 ± 0.18 
Average 66.83 ± 0.26 89.24 ± 0.17 99.70 ± 0.03 87.22 ± 0.18 
Table 9.6: Grammatical Evolution precision multi-classification results 
The classifiers achieved low DOS detection rate during training and testing. The average detection 
rate, worst classifier detection rate and best classifier intrusion detection rates were similar during 
training and testing. The approach achieved a high detection rate for Probe attacks during testing and 
a lower detection rate during training as compared to the detection of R2L attacks. 
9.2.2.6 False Positive Rate  
The results of the training and testing of the multi-class classifiers generated using grammatical 
evolution and using false positive rate as the fitness function are presented in Table 9.6. The classifiers 
achieved low false positive rates of 6% during training and 9% during testing. The classifiers also 
achieved similar detection rates both during training and testing as summarized in the table.  
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 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 63.82 ± 0.26 90.75 ± 0.16 99.96 ± 0.01 99.21 ± 0.05 
Worst 63.54 ± 0.26 90.75 ± 0.16 99.96 ± 0.01 99.21 ± 0.05 
Average 63.55 ± 0.26 90.75 ± 0.16 99.96 ± 0.01 99.21 ± 0.05 
 
 
Testing 
Best 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 99.70 ± 0.03 87.20 ± 0.18 
Worst 66.86 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 99.70 ± 0.03 87.20 ± 0.18 
Average 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 99.70 ± 0.03 87.20 ± 0.18 
Table 9.7: Grammatical Evolution FPR multi-classification results 
9.2.3 Analysis of multi-class classification for GE approach 
The results of the testing phase using the different performance measures as fitness functions for 
generating multi- class classifiers for GE are summarised in Figure 9.1. 
 
The classifier generated using f-score as the fitness function outperformed the other classifiers. 
The results were not statistically significant when compared to the results of the classifier produced 
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Figure 9.1: GE comparison of fitness function performance 
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using accuracy as the fitness function. Grammatical evolution performed well achieving generally high 
accuracy rates for both binary classification and multi-class classification. Classifiers that were 
produced using f-score, accuracy and Matthews’s coefficient correlation achieved higher accuracy 
rates.  The higher accuracy rates suggest that the performance measures perform well for detecting 
both intrusive and normal connections as well as unknown data. Both classifiers achieved the same 
accuracy for detecting Probe attacks. The classifier using f-score will be used when comparing the 
different approaches. 
 Multi-Expression Programming 
This section presents the results obtained by the applying the MEP approach described in Chapter 8 
for binary and multi-class classification. 
9.3.1 Binary Classification 
Multi-expression programming was successfully applied for the generation of binary classifiers. The 
results of the approach are presented in Table 9.8. The best classifier achieved a true positive rate of 
93.2% during training and 66% during testing. The classifier achieved a higher false positive rate of 5.6% 
during testing as compared to 3.95% achieved during the training and generation of the classifier. The 
overall performance of the classifier was high achieving a high accuracy rate of 78.23% during testing 
as summarised in Table 9.8.  
 Training Testing 
Accuracy 
Best classifier 94.72 ± 0.12 78.23 ± 0.23 
Worst classifier 76.69 ± 0.23 76.69 ± 0.23 
Average 92.59 ± 0.14  
Table 9.8: Multi-Expression programming binary classification results 
The average runtime of MEP to evolve a classifier was 6 hours during training and evaluation of 
the classifier on the testing set took an average runtime of 1 minute. 
9.3.2 Multi-class classification 
The subsections below present the results of applying MEP using each of the six performance 
measures outlined in section 8.6 as fitness functions for generating multi-class classifiers for network 
intrusion detection. The average runtime of MEP to evolve each of the classifiers discussed below was 
 
95 
 
6 hours during training and evaluation of performance on the testing set took an average runtime of 
1 minute for each of the classifiers. 
9.3.2.1 Accuracy  
The training and testing results of the classifiers that were generated using accuracy as the fitness 
function for multi-class classification using multi-expression programming are presented in Table 9.9. 
The best classifier obtained a high false positive rate of 5% during training and 7% during testing. Tests 
were performed to find the possible reasons for the high false positive rate. High accuracy rates were 
achieved for detecting intrusive connections with the best classifier achieving a 96% true positive rate 
during testing. 
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 97.42 ± 0.09 96.08 ± 0.11 99.97 ± 0.01 99.33 ± 0.05 
Worst 93.5 ± 0.14 91.12 ± 0.16 99.96 ± 0.01 99.25 ± 0.04 
Average 95.28 ± 0.12 92.67 ± 0.14 99.96 ± 0.01 99.28 ± 0.04 
 
 
Testing 
Best 86.10 ± 0.19 91.24 ± 0.16 99.70 ± 0.03 88.98 ± 0.17 
Worst 85.65 ± 0.19 89.63 ± 0.17 99.70 ± 0.03 87.20 ± 0.18 
Average 85.00 ± 0.20 90.95 ± 0.16 99.70 ± 0.03 88.44 ± 0.18 
Table 9.9: MEP accuracy multi-classification results 
The best MEP classifier achieved high detection rates during the training of U2R and R2L intrusive 
connections and achieved high detection rates for detecting U2R and Probe intrusive connections 
during testing. The high detection rate for U2R can be attributed to fewer connections existing in the 
dataset for U2R. Probe attacks achieved the lowest detection rates during training but during testing 
achieved the second highest detection rates.  
9.3.2.2 Matthews’s coefficient correlation  
The following table presents the results obtained from applying MCC as the fitness function for 
generating multi-class classifiers. During training, the best classifier achieved a high accuracy rate and a low false 
positive rate of 4%. The low positive rate during testing was low (3.5%) similar to the one achieved during training. 
Individuals generated using MCC as a performance measure have a balance between the true positive rate and the true 
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negative rate resulting in low false positive rates.  The low false positive rate and high true positive rate resulted in classifiers 
achieving a high accuracy as summarised in Table 9.10. 
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 97.51 ± 0.09 95.97 ± 0.11 99.97 ± 0.01 99.33 ± 0.05 
Worst 92.8 ± 0.14 92.37 ± 0.15 99.95 ± 0.01 98.32 ± 0.07 
Average 94.94 ± 0.12 94.04 ± 0.13 99.96 ± 0.01 98.98 ± 0.05 
 
 
Testing 
Best 85.72 ± 0.19 92.21 ± 0.15 99.71 ± 0.03 88.72 ± 0.17 
Worst 82.49 ± 0.21 91.75 ± 0.15 99.69 ± 0.03 90.41 ± 0.16 
Average 85.23 ± 0.19 90.15 ± 0.16 99.71 ± 0.03 90.68 ± 0.18 
Table 9.10: MEP Matthews’s coefficient correlation multi-classification results 
9.3.2.3 F-Score  
Table 9.11 presents the results of the best and worst classifiers generated from using f-score as the 
fitness function for generating multi-class classifiers using multi gene programming. The best classifier 
during training achieved high accuracies for detecting intrusions with the highest accuracy achieved 
for the detection of U2R attacks and DOS attacks. The best classifier achieved a false positive rate of 3.7% 
during training and 5.4% during testing. 
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 98.16 ± 0.07 96.45 ± 0.10 99.97 ± 0.01 99.32 ± 0.05 
Worst 92.94 ± 0.14 91.32 ± 0.15 71.46 ± 0.25 79.54 ± 0.22 
Average 95.82 ± 0.11 93.98 ± 0.13 91.49 ± 0.10 90.51 ± 0.14 
 
 
Testing 
Best 86.24 ± 0.19 94.03 ± 0.13 99.76 ± 0.03 87.06 ± 0.18 
Worst 85.26 ± 0.20 91.21 ± 0.16 62.34 ± 0.27 77.83 ± 0.17 
Average 85.30 ± 0.19 90.74 ± 0.16 90.14 ± 0.11 85.44 ± 0.19 
Table 9.11: MEP f-score multi-classification results  
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The worst classifier achieved the lowest detection rate for detecting U2R attacks both during 
training and testing even though the number of U2R connections within the dataset were the lowest. 
The low classification rate was a result of a low true positive rate and high false positive rate of 60%. 
9.3.2.4 True Positive Rate  
Table 9.12 presents the results obtained from applying MEP using the true positive rate as the fitness 
function. The best classifier achieved a true positive rate of 95% during testing but could not correctly 
distinguish between normal connections and intrusive connections resulting in a high false positive 
rate of 18%.  
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 64.36 ± 0.26 92.33 ± 0.15 99.21 ± 0.05 99.21 ± 0.05 
Worst 63.54 ± 0.27 90.75 ± 0.16 96.49 ± 0.10 96.49 ± 0.10 
Average 63.60 ± 0.27 90.82 ± 0.16 99.05 ± 0.05 99.05 ± 0.05 
 
 
Testing 
Best 66.87 ± 0.27 91.55 ± 0.15 87.20 ± 0.18 87.20 ± 0.18 
Worst 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 81.71 ± 0.21 81.71 ± 0.20 
Average 66.90 ± 0.26 89.37 ± 0.17 86.82 ± 0.19 86.92 ± 0.19 
Table 9.12: MEP true positive rate multi-classification results 
The high true positive rate and high false positive rate resulted in the classifier achieving a low 
accuracy rate both during training and testing. 
9.3.2.5 Precision  
The results obtained from applying MEP for generating multi-class classifiers using precision as the 
fitness function are presented in Table 9.13. The best classifier achieved a true positive of 85% during 
testing and 90% during training. The classifier also achieved a high false positive rate of 20% during 
training and 15% during testing. The performance measure measures how well the classifier detects 
intrusive connections over all the positive connections (true positive rate and false positive rate) 
returned during training and testing. The high false positive rate and high true positive rate resulted 
in the classifier achieving a low overall accuracy. 
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 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 63.54 ± 0.27 90.75 ± 0.16 99.21 ± 0.05 99.21 ± 0.05 
Worst 63.54 ± 0.27 89.81 ± 0.17 99.21 ± 0.05 99.21 ± 0.05 
Average 63.54 ± 0.27 90.71 ± 0.16 99.21 ± 0.05 99.21 ± 0.05 
 
 
Testing 
Best 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 87.21 ± 0.18 87.21 ± 0.18 
Worst 66.91 ± 0.26 84.71 ± 0.20 87.21 ± 0.18 87.21 ± 0.18 
Average 66.91 ± 0.26 89.28 ± 0.17 87.21 ± 0.18 87.21 ± 0.18 
Table 9.13: MEP precision multi-classification results 
9.3.2.6 False Positive Rate  
The training and testing results of the classifiers that were generated using the false positive rate as 
the fitness function for multi-class classification using multi-expression programming are presented in 
Table 9.14. The best classifier correctly detected 80% of normal connections (true negative rate) 
during training and 85% during testing. The best classifier achieved a low false positive rate during 
training of 0.02% and 2.1% during testing but failed to correctly detect intrusive connections resulting 
in the overall performance of the classifier being low. 
 
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 63.54 ± 0.27 90.75 ± 0.16 99.96 ± 0.01 99.21 ± 0.05 
Worst 63.54 ± 0.27 90.75 ± 0.16 93.38 ± 0.13 99.16 ± 0.05 
Average 63.54 ± 0.27 90.75 ± 0.16 99.49 ± 0.02 99.21 ± 0.05 
 
 
Testing 
Best 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 99.70 ± 0.03 87.20 ± 0.18 
Worst 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 95.08 ± 0.12 87.19 ± 0.18 
Average 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 99.37 ± 0.03 87.20 ± 0.18 
Table 9.14: MEP false positive rate multi-classification results 
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Detection of intrusive connections using the false positive rate as the fitness function resulted in 
low detection rates for DOS attacks in comparison to previous classifiers using different fitness 
functions. The approach generated similar solutions during training resulting in all the classifiers 
trained achieving the same detection rate. 
9.3.3 Analysis of multi-class classification for MEP approach 
Figure 9.2 illustrates the results of the testing phase using the different performance measures for 
evolving multi-class classifiers using MEP. 
From the results presented for multi-class classification using multi-expression programming, the 
classifiers which were generated using the f-score as the fitness function achieved higher detection 
rates than the other classifiers generated using the different fitness functions.  There was no statistical 
significance in the results when statistical tests were conducted. It should be noted that even though 
no statistical significance of the results was achieved, the classifiers using the f-score as the fitness 
function will be used for comparison with other approaches. 
 
100 
 
 Genetic Programming 
This section presents the results obtained by the applying the GP approach described in Chapter 6 for 
binary and multi-class classification. 
9.4.1 Binary Classification 
The training and testing results of the GP approach are presented in Table 9.1. The table presents the 
details of the classifier which achieved the highest accuracy (best classifier) as well as the classifier 
which achieved the lowest accuracy (worst classifier) during training.  
 Training Testing 
Accuracy 
Best classifier 98.06 ± 0.08 80.30 ± 0.22 
Worst classifier 96.43 ± 0.10 74.39 ± 0.24 
Training Average 97.74 ± 0.08  
Table 9.15: Genetic programming binary classification results 
Fscore Accuracy MCC FPR PPV
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Figure 9.2: MEP comparison of fitness function performance 
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The two classifiers were evaluated on the testing set of the NSL-KDD dataset in order to evaluate 
the overall performance of the classifiers. The average runtime of GP to evolve a classifier was 5 hours 
during training and evaluation of the classifier on the testing set took an average runtime of 30 
seconds. The best classifier achieved a false positive rate of 1.79% during training. The classifier 
correctly classified 97.88% of intrusive connections as intrusions and correctly classified 98.21% of 
normal connections during training. During testing, the best classifier achieved a false positive rate 
of 3.6%, correctly classified 68.11% of intrusive connections as intrusions and correctly classified 
96.40% of normal connections. 
9.4.2 Multi-class classification 
The results of the six performance measures used as fitness functions for generating multi-class 
classifiers using the genetic programming approach outlined in Section 6.6 are presented in the 
subsections below. The average runtime of MEP to evolve each of the classifiers discussed below was 
2 hours during training and evaluation of performance on the testing set took an average runtime of 
1 minute for each of the classifiers. 
9.4.2.1 Accuracy  
Table 9.2 presents the results of using accuracy as the fitness function for generating a multiclass 
classifier. The best classifier achieved high detection rates of more than 99% for each of the network 
attacks during training and the detection rates reduced during testing. The false positive rate of the 
best classifier was 6%. The classifier achieved the highest detection rates for U2R attacks. The high 
detection of U2R attacks can be attributed to the few U2R connections which exist in both the training 
and the testing sets. The classifier also achieved a high detection rate for Probe attacks which 
contribute 9% of the training set and 11% of the testing set. This contributes in the classifier achieving 
an overall high detection rate. 
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 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 99.76 ± 0.03 98.97 ± 0.06 99.98 ± 0.01 99.7 ± 0.03 
Worst 94.52 ± 0.13 92.48 ± 0.14 99.96 ± 0.01 99.21 ± 0.05 
Average 97.89 ± 0.07 96.74 ± 0.09 99.97 ± 0.01 99.32 ± 0.05 
 
 
Testing 
Best 88.93 ± 0.17 92.97 ± 0.14 99.73 ± 0.03 88.34 ± 0.18 
Worst 84.47 ± 0.20 91.69 ± 0.15 99.70 ± 0.03 87.20 ± 0.18 
Average 86.84 ± 0.19 92.36 ± 0.15 99.71 ± 0.03 87.61 ± 0.18 
Table 9.16: GP accuracy multi-classification results 
9.4.2.2 Matthews’s coefficient correlation (MCC)   
The results obtained from applying GP for generating multi-class classifiers using MCC as the fitness 
function are presented in Table 9.3. The best classifier achieved a false positive rate of 4% during 
testing. During training, the sensitivity rate of the best classifier was high, correctly detecting most of 
the intrusive connections. The best classifier achieved the same U2R detection rate as the best 
classifier generated using accuracy as the fitness function during training but during testing, the 
classifier using accuracy outperformed the classifier generated from using MCC in correctly detecting 
two of the four network attacks. 
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 99.78 ± 0.03 98.10 ± 0.08 99.98 ± 0.01 99.67 ± 0.03 
Worst 63.54 ± 0.26 92.49 ± 0.14 99.96 ± 0.01 99.02 ± 0.05 
Average 89.02 ± 0.12 95.23 ± 0.11 99.97 ± 0.01 99.35 ± 0.04 
 
 
Testing 
Best 87.84 ± 0.18 92.43 ± 0.15 99.75 ± 0.03 89.23 ± 0.17 
Worst 66.91 ± 0.26 94.08 ± 0.13 99.70 ± 0.03 87.98 ± 0.18 
Average 81.87 ± 0.20 90.78 ± 0.16 99.73 ± 0.03 88.10 ± 0.18 
Table 9.17: GP Matthews’s coefficient correlation multi-classification results 
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9.4.2.3 F-Score   
The training and testing results of the classifiers that were generated using f-score as the fitness 
function for multi-class classification using genetic programming are presented in Table 9.4. The 
classifiers generated using f-score achieved high accuracy rates with a high detection of U2R attacks 
as compared to other network attacks. The best classifier achieved a false positive rate of 2% during 
training and 3% during testing. The classifier generated using the f-score as the fitness measure 
achieved the lowest false positive rate as compared to the classifiers generated using accuracy and 
MCC as the fitness measure. 
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 99.79 ± 0.03 98.62 ± 0.06 99.98 ± 0.01 99.75 ± 0.03 
Worst 95.16 ± 0.12 92.43 ± 0.15 77.40 ± 0.23 86.63 ± 0.19 
Average 97.91 ± 0.07 96.83 ± 0.06 95.30 ± 0.09 98.85 ± 0.05 
 
 
Testing 
Best 90.31 ± 0.16 90.12 ± 0.16 99.73 ± 0.03 87.27 ± 0.18 
Worst 84.13 ± 0.20 91.37 ± 0.15 70.76 ± 0.25 86.33 ± 0.19 
Average 87.29 ± 0.18 91.27 ± 0.15 93.22 ± 0.11 87.97 ± 0.18 
Table 9.18: GP f-score multi-classification results 
9.4.2.4 True Positive Rate   
Table 9.5 presents the results of using the true positive rate as the fitness function for generating 
multi-class classifiers using genetic programming. The best classifier achieved a high true positive rate 
of 96% during training and 92% during testing because the fitness measure favours detection of true 
positives within a dataset. The overall performance of the classifier was lower because the false 
positive rate of the classifier was high. The classifier achieved a false positive rate of 16% during 
training and 20% during testing. The high false positive rate was a result of a low detection rate of 
intrusive connections. 
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 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 64.36 ± 0.26 92.33 ± 0.15 99.21 ± 0.05 99.21 ± 0.05 
Worst 63.54 ± 0.27 90.75 ± 0.16 96.49 ± 0.10 96.49 ± 0.10 
Average 63.60 ± 0.27 90.82 ± 0.16 99.05 ± 0.05 99.05 ± 0.05 
 
 
Testing 
Best 66.87 ± 0.27 91.55 ± 0.15 87.20 ± 0.18 87.20 ± 0.18 
Worst 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 81.71 ± 0.21 81.71 ± 0.20 
Average 66.90 ± 0.26 89.37 ± 0.17 86.82 ± 0.19 86.92 ± 0.19 
Table 9.19: GP true positive rate multi-classification results 
9.4.2.5 Precision   
The results of applying precision as the fitness function for generating multi-class classifiers for 
intrusion detection are presented in Table 9.6. The best classifier achieved high accuracy rates during 
training but did not achieve a similar accuracy rate during testing. The best classifier achieved a false 
positive rate of 6% during training and 9% during testing. 
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 90.02 ± 0.16 92.87 ± 0.14 99.96 ± 0.01 99.25 ± 0.05 
Worst 63.54 ± 0.26 90.75 ± 0.16 99.96 ± 0.01 99.20 ± 0.05 
Average 65.59 ± 0.26 90.89 ± 0.16 99.96 ± 0.01 99.21 ± 0.05 
 
 Best 71.97 ± 0.25 89.78 ± 0.17 99.72 ± 0.03 87.37 ± 0.18 
Testing Worst 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 99.70 ± 0.03 87.21 ± 0.18 
Average 67.11 ± 0.26 89.29 ± 0.17 99.71 ± 0.03 87.21 ± 0.18 
Table 9.20: GP precision multi-classification results 
9.4.2.6 False Positive Rate   
The training and testing results of the classifiers that were generated using the false positive rate as 
the fitness function for multi-class classification using genetic programming are presented in Table 
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9.7. The fitness function favours generating effective classifiers which are similar in structure resulting 
in both the best and worst classifiers obtaining the similar classification results. The best classifier 
achieved a low false positive rate of 3% during training and 5% during testing. 
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
 
Training 
Best 63.54 ± 0.27 90.75 ± 0.16 99.96 ± 0.01 99.21 ± 0.05 
Worst 63.54 ± 0.27 90.75 ± 0.16 93.38 ± 0.13 99.16 ± 0.05 
Average 63.54 ± 0.27 90.75 ± 0.16 99.49 ± 0.02 99.21 ± 0.05 
 
 
Testing 
Best 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 99.70 ± 0.03 87.20 ± 0.18 
Worst 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 95.08 ± 0.12 87.19 ± 0.18 
Average 66.91 ± 0.26 89.26 ± 0.17 99.37 ± 0.03 87.20 ± 0.18 
Table 9.21: GP false positive rate multi-classification results 
9.4.3 Analysis of multi-class classification for the GP approach 
Figure 9.3 illustrates the test results of using the different performance measures for evolving multi-
class classifiers using GP. 
 
Figure 9.3: GP comparison of fitness function performance 
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From the results presented for multi-class classification using genetic programming, the classifiers 
which were generated using the Matthews coefficient correlation as the fitness function achieved 
higher detection rates than the other classifiers generated using the different fitness functions. The 
difference in the detection rates were not statistically significant when compared to the results 
achieved by using f-score and accuracy as fitness functions. It should be noted that even though these 
results were not statistically significant, the classifiers using the MCC as the fitness function will be 
used for comparison with other approaches. 
 Comparison of GP, GE and MEP 
The following sections compare the results produced from using Genetic Programming, Multi-
Expression programming and Grammatical Evolution for evolving binary and multi-class classifiers. 
9.5.1 Binary classification 
The results of the best classifiers for the three approaches GP, GE and MEP described in this thesis are 
presented in Figure 9.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the results presented in the previous sections, the proposed genetic programming approach 
outperforms the other two approaches for binary classification. The GP binary classifier achieves a 
high accuracy during both training and testing. MEP achieves similar results compared to GP during 
testing. The results also show that MEP can generalize well on unseen data. During the comparison of 
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Figure 9.4: Binary classification comparison 
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the three approaches, the GE approach had a lower runtime during training compared to the other two 
approaches.  
9.5.1.1 Statistical Comparison  
The section below outlines the statistical tests used to evaluate the statistical significance of the 
differences in performance of GE, MEP and GP for binary class classification. 
The one-tailed Z- test discussed in section 5.4.1 was used to determine the statistical significance. The 
results of the Z-test were used to determine whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis. The value 
of Z was calculated and compared to the critical value. If the Z- value was lower than the critical value 
(1.64), the null hypothesis (H0) was accepted, otherwise the alternate hypothesis was accepted (Ha). 
The tests were evaluated at the 0.05 significance level.  
Hypothesis 1: 
• H0: There is no difference in the mean objective value for genetic programming and 
grammatical evolution. 
• Ha: The objective mean value for genetic programming is greater than the objective mean 
value for grammatical evolution. 
Hypothesis 2: 
• H0: There is no difference in the mean objective value for genetic programming and multi-
expression programming. 
• Ha: The objective mean value for genetic programming is greater than the objective mean 
value for multi-expression programming. 
 
 GP vs GE Test GP vs MEP Test 
Z-Value 24.80 8.60 
Table 9.22: Statistical test results for binary classification 
Table 9.22 presents the Z-value for Hypothesis 1 and for Hypothesis 2 for binary classification.  From 
the results presented in the table above, the Z-value for GP vs GE test was greater than the critical 
value resulting in the null hypothesis being rejected. The alternate hypothesis was accepted and from 
the results of the performance, genetic programming performed significantly better than grammatical 
evolution resulting in the performance of genetic programming being statistically significant. From the 
Z-value for GP vs MEP test, the null hypothesis was also rejected and the performance of genetic 
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programming was significantly better than multi-expression programming performance resulting in 
the alternate hypothesis being accepted.  
9.5.2 Multi-class classification 
Figure 9.5 presents a summary of the results achieved from applying grammatical evolution, genetic 
programming and multi-expression programming for multi-class classification. The results represent a 
comparison of the best performing classifiers obtained using each of the approaches. 
Figure 9.5: Multi-class classification comparison 
 
From the results presented in the previous sections, all the classifiers achieved high detection 
rates during both training and testing for user to root attacks (U2R) and also achieved high detection 
rates for remote to user (R2L) during training but achieved lower detection rates during testing. Each 
approach achieved similar results for detection of the different network attacks. For the detection of 
probe attacks, the classifier generated using MEP outperforms the other 2 approaches, for the 
detection of DOS attacks, the GP classifier achieves higher detection rates as compare to the other 
two approaches and for the detection of R2L attacks, the classifier generated from applying GE 
achieves a higher detection rates as compared to the other two classifiers. The GE approach averaged 
5 hours for generating the classifier whilst MEP averaged 8 hours and GP averaging around 14 hours 
per run. 
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9.5.2.1 Statistical Comparison 
The section below outlines the statistical tests used to evaluate the statistical significance of the 
differences in performance of GE, MEP and GP for multi-class classification. 
Hypothesis 1: 
• H0: There is no difference in the mean objective value for genetic programming and 
grammatical evolution. 
• Ha: The objective mean value for genetic programming is greater than the objective mean 
value for grammatical evolution. 
Hypothesis 2: 
• H0: There is no difference in the mean objective value for genetic programming and multi-
expression programming. 
• Ha: The objective mean value for genetic programming is greater than the objective mean 
value for multi-expression programming. 
 
 GP vs GE Test GP vs MEP Test 
Z-Value -2.70 -3.38 
Table 9.23: Statistical test results for multi-class classification 
From the results presented in the Table 9.23, the Z-value for GP vs GE test was lower than the critical 
value resulting in the alternate hypothesis being rejected. The null hypothesis was accepted and from 
the results of the performance, both the performance of grammatical evolution and genetic 
programming achieved similar detection rates resulting in the performance of grammatical evolution 
and genetic programming not being statistically significant. The null hypothesis was also accepted the 
alternate hypothesis rejected based on the Z-value for GP vs MEP, with both multi-expression 
programming and genetic programming achieving similar results for intrusion detection. 
 Comparison with state of the art 
The following sections compare the performance of the proposed approaches to the state-of-the-art 
methods for network intrusion detection. 
9.6.1 Binary Classification 
Table 9.23 presents a comparison of the proposed binary classifier described in this thesis with state-
of-the-art binary classifiers within network intrusion detection. 
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The comparison was empirical in nature as a formal performance comparison was not possible due 
to the different experimental setup applied in each of the studies used for comparison. Furthermore, 
it was not clear in all of studies whether all records were used or only a subset of the training and 
testing sets. The proposed approaches performed well with the proposed GP approach outperforming 
four of the seven approaches used for comparison. The proposed approaches where also compared 
to other approaches such as Self-Organization Map (SOM) and Support Vector Machine (SVM). The 
state-of the-art approaches which applied neural networks for intrusion detection also performed 
feature selection which resulted in the approaches achieving higher detection rates as compared to 
the proposed approaches. Different unsupervised and supervised filter approaches such as Random 
Projection (RP) and Nominal-to-Binary (N2B) where applied by some state-of-the-art approaches such 
as Naïve Bayes which resulted in the approach achieving higher detection rates as compared to the 
proposed approaches in this thesis 
Approach Accuracy 
Proposed GP 80.30 
Proposed MEP 78.23 
Proposed GE 74.55 
Decision Tree (J48) [85] 81.05 
Naïve Bayes [85] 76.56 
Support Vector Machine [85] 69.52 
Multi-layer Perceptron [85] 77.41 
Multinomial naïve Bayes [66] 96.50 
Hybrid (Fuzzy logic + GP) [41] 82.74 
Self-Organization Map (SOM) [36] 75.49 
Table 9.24: State of the art for binary classification. 
9.6.2 Multi-class classification 
Table 9.24 presents a comparison of the proposed approaches presented in this thesis with state-of-
the-art approaches for multi-class classifications. The proposed approaches outperform the state-of-
the-art approaches for the detection of U2R attacks. The proposed approaches also outperform some 
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of the state-of-the-art approaches for the detection of probe attacks and obtain similar results for 
detecting R2L attacks.  
Support Vector Machines outperformed the proposed approaches for detecting DOS attacks and 
R2L attacks. Random Forests which applied feature selection to determine the 13 most effective 
features from the 41 features in the dataset outperformed the proposed approaches for detecting all 
the network attacks. 
 
 
 
Approach Network Attack 
 DOS Probe U2R R2L 
Proposed GP 87.84 92.43 99.75 89.23 
Proposed GE 87.54 92.18 99.70 89.26 
Proposed MEP 86.24 94.03 99.76 87.06 
Random Forest [75] 98.70 97.60 97.50 96.80 
J48 decision Tree [75] 82.40 80.20 73.90 87.60 
Support Vector Machine [75] 97.80 90.70 93.70 91.80 
Naïve Bayes [75] 72.70 70.90 70.70 69.80 
CART [75] 82.70 82.10 73.10 80.80 
Table 9.25: State of the art for multi-class classification 
 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented and discussed the results of the proposed approaches discussed in the 
previous chapters. The investigations discussed in this chapter include determining the best fitness 
function measure for generating classifiers which can obtain high detection rates for intrusive 
connections. The chapter also compared the classifiers generated from approaches genetic 
programming, grammatical evolution and multi-expression programming for the detection of intrusive 
connections. Furthermore, a comparison between the proposed approaches and state of the art 
approaches for network intrusion detection was conducted. 
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10 Conclusion and Future Work  
 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the findings of this dissertation and provides a conclusion to each of the 
objectives outlined in chapter 1. Possible future work based on the research provided in this thesis is 
also provided. 
 Objectives and Conclusion 
The section provides a summary of how each of the objectives outlined in Chapter 1 was met and a 
summary of the findings. Future work based on the objective is also provided. 
10.2.1 Effectiveness of using grammatical evolution (GE) for generating intrusion detection 
classifiers 
 
Grammatical Evolution (GE) was used to evolve intrusion detection classifiers. Few studies from 
previous literature had successfully applied GE for generating classifiers achieving high detection 
rates.  Experiments presented in this thesis were conducted on the KDD’99 dataset. The results from 
the experiments revealed that classifiers generated from applying GE for network intrusion detection 
achieve high detection rates for binary and multi-class classifiers. Multi-class classifiers achieved 
higher detection rates for R2L attacks than detecting other network attack categories. The classifiers 
did not outperform some of the state-of-the-art approaches. Future work will investigate different 
ways to efficiently explore the search space when evolving classifiers using GE. 
10.2.2 Development and evaluation of applying multi-expression programming (MEP) for 
generating binary and multi-class classifiers for network intrusion detection.  
 
Binary and multi-class intrusion detection classifiers were evolved using multi-expression 
programming. Multi-expression programming (MEP) was used for evolving the classifiers based on the 
analysis of previous literature. The proof by demonstration methodology was applied to refine the 
evolved classifiers. 
Chapter  10 
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The results from the experiments conducted revealed that binary classifiers evolved using MEP 
were able to generalize well on unseen data. The implementation also revealed that even though the 
use for MEP to evolve intrusion detection classifiers has not been common, the approach has the 
potential to evolve classifiers which can achieve high detection rates. The classifiers generated 
outperformed some of the state-of-the-art approaches which used the same dataset for binary and 
multi-class intrusion detection. Future work will investigate different representations of MEP 
individuals for generating effective intrusion detection classifiers. 
10.2.3 Develop and analyze the performance of using genetic programming (GP) for generating 
binary and multiclass classifiers for network intrusion detection.  
 
Genetic programming (GP) was applied to evolve network intrusion detection (NID) classifiers and 
evaluate the performance of the classifiers on the publicly available KDD’99 dataset. GP was widely 
used for generating NID classifiers in previous literature with some of the evolved classifiers achieving 
high detection rates. The results presented in this thesis show that binary and multi-class classifiers 
evolved using GP can achieve high detection rates which can outperform other state of the art 
approaches used in previous literature. Future research will aim to investigate using different 
representations for GP individuals. 
10.2.4 Investigate the effectiveness of fitness functions for network intrusion detection  
 
This study investigated the effectiveness of using different fitness functions for the generating multi-
class intrusion detection classifiers. Six fitness functions were proposed based on analysis of previous 
literature within the network intrusion detection domain. Each of the six fitness functions were 
applied during the generation of multi-class classifiers. The motivation behind this study was based 
on different studies applying different fitness functions for the generation of intrusive detection 
classifiers and achieving different detection rates. Experiments were conducted using the KDD’99 
dataset. The results revealed that different fitness functions affected the detection rates of classifiers 
evolved. Using accuracy, f-score and Matthew’s correlation coefficient as fitness functions yielded 
classifiers which achieved high detection rates. 
Future research will aim to investigate the use of weighted fitness functions for generating 
intrusion detection classifiers. Future work will also include evaluating other fitness functions not 
commonly used for intrusion detection. 
10.2.5 Comparative analysis of GE, MEP and GP for network intrusion detection. 
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This study compared the performance of using three variants of genetic programming (GE, MEP and 
GP) to evolve binary and multi-class intrusion detection classifiers. The rationale behind this study was 
based on an analysis of previous literature in which a comparison of the effect of using different 
variants of genetic programming for network intrusion detection was not performed.  
Binary intrusion detection classifiers evolved using genetic programming obtained high detection 
rates as compared to binary classifiers evolved using multi-expression programming and grammatical 
evolution. The results from evolving multi-class classifiers revealed that classifiers evolved using 
genetic programming achieved high detection rate for detecting DOS attacks, multi-expression 
programming classifiers achieved high detection rates for detecting Probe attacks and grammatical 
evolution classifiers achieved high detection rate for detecting R2L attacks. Similar results were 
achieved for detecting U2R attacks using classifiers evolved using the three approaches. Future 
research will investigate the generation of a hybridized intrusion detection classifier which combines 
the different variants of genetic programming.  
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A. User Manual 
Program requirements 
In order to run the NID system, Java must be installed. Java can be obtained from the following website 
(https://java.com/en/download/). Once Java has been installed the program can be used. 
Initialising the Program 
The program can be started by executing the NetworkIntrusionDetection.jar located in the SYSTEM 
folder on the CD. The main menu will appear as shown in the Figure A.1. 
 
Figure A.1: Network Intrusion Detection System Main Menu 
Overview of the program 
The Top-level tab menu is made up of the Genetic Programming approaches discussed in this thesis. 
Each top-level tab menu has two lower level tab menu binary classification and multi-class 
classification. 
• Genetic Programming – corresponds to using Genetic Programming for Network Intrusion 
Detection described in Chapter 6. 
• Grammatical Evolution – corresponds to using Grammatical Evolution for Network Intrusion 
Detection described in Chapter 7. 
• Multi-Expression Programming – corresponds to using Multi-Expression Programming for 
network Intrusion Detection described in Chapter 8.  
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Experiment Configurations 
Two configurations are provided for interacting with the program. Each configuration requires either 
a training dataset, testing dataset or both training and testing dataset. These datasets are located in 
the Datasets folder on the CD provided. The datasets are divided into Binary Classification datasets 
and Multi-class datasets. The multi-class datasets are split based on the attack category described in 
Chapter 5. 
• Train and Test  
All the parameters must be entered before the run can start as illustrated in Figure A.2. After training 
and testing datasets have been selected. The run will begin by selecting Start Experiment. The run will 
continue running in the background for the duration of the experiment until it has completed and a 
popup message has appeared. The experiments use the distributed architecture discussed in Chapter 
5. 
 
Figure A.2: Train and Test using NID System 
Once training and testing has completed a popup message will appear as in illustrated in Figure 
A.3. This message indicates the location of the output file. The output file contains information about 
run, and performance measures for the evolved classifier.  
 
126 
 
 
Figure A.3: End of run Message 
• Test using best classifier  
This Configuration is used to evaluate the performance of pre-defined classifiers on different datasets. 
For example, if you want to evaluate just how well the best classifier achieved from using Genetic 
Programming for Multi-class classification, the user selects the test dataset using the File chooser 
option invoked when “Browse” on the Testing panel is selected.  
 
Figure A.4: Selecting best classifier 
After selecting a test dataset, click “Test Using best Classifier” which will open a file choose dialog 
and navigate to …/Datasets/Best_Classifiers folder which contains all the best classifiers for the 
experiments conducted in this thesis. Once the preferred classifier has been selected the system will 
evaluate the performance of the classifier on the dataset and write the results to an output file. Figure 
A.4 and Figure A.5 illustrate test using best classifier for multi-class genetic programming for DOS 
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attacks.
 
Figure A.5: Results of evaluation 
